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THE HEARING OFFICER PROBLEM
SYMPTOM AND SYMBOL
Ralph F. Fuchs*
I. THE DEMAND FOR REFORM AS TO FEDERAL HEARING OFFICERS
What has come to be known as the federal hearing officer problem has
been much bruited about since the failure of Section 11 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,' as administered, to produce a generally satisfac-
tory state of affairs.2 The question presented is in reality one phase of a
larger complex of issues surrounding administrative proceedings. The
likelihood that an attempted answer to the specific problem through
amendment of Section 11 or through administrative changes will be for-
mulated in the near future3 renders it timely to undertake to deal in this
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 326, for biographical data.
1 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952). This section (infra, note 39) provides for
the method of selecting, compensating, and dismissing hearing officers who, under section 7,
preside at hearings in formal agency proceedings (see infra, note 14).
2 The history of the administration of Section 11 and of the controversies surrounding that
administration is told in Morgan Thomas, "The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners:
Pressure Groups and the Administrative Process," 59 Yale L.J. 431 (1950); Fuchs, "The
Hearing Officer Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737
(1950) ; and pp. 17-41 of the Draft Report, Committee on Hearing Officers of the President's
Conference on Administrative Procedure, transmitted to the Conference by four members of
the Committee on August 10, 1954, and submitted as a final report, with changes of detail,
by these members on September 8, 1954. The comments of the other four members of the
same committee on the issues raised by this history appear at pp. 10-36 of their report
which was transmitted to the Conference on September 3, 1954. Both reports are entitled
"Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers." Litigation surrounding certain fea-
tures of the administration of Section 11 culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
3 Two bills providing for the appointment of hearing officers by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, S. 1708 and H.R. 9035, were introduced in the 83d Con-
gress. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary in the closing days of the second session
recommended that the former bill pass. Sen. Rep. 2199, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954). In
March, 1954 the American Bar Association committed itself to elimination of the authority
of the Civil Service Commission in the administration of Section 11 .of the Administrative
Procedure Act and advocated "the independent appointment of Federal hearing officers,
whether by an independent Office of Federal Administrative Procedure if such an office is
created, by Presidential appointment, or by other appropriate means." 40 A.BA.J. 446
(1954). The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure at its meeting October
14-15, 1954, endorsed the continuance of Civil Service Commission administration of Section
11 of the present Act, but recommended certain administrative changes not requiring legis-
lation. Minutes, Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday, October 15, 1954, 3-4. In the meantime
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover
Commission), through its Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure, has also taken up
the hearing officer problem. See statement of James M. Douglas, Task Force Chairman,
printed at 6 Admin. L. Bull., 122-123 (1954); Robert G. Storey, "The Second Hoover Com-
mission: Its Legal Task Force," 40 A.B.A.J. 483, 537-538 (1954). As a result of existing
dissatisfaction and the attention thus being centered on the problem, it seems probable that
new measures will be formulated and adopted.
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paper with certain factors that are believed to underlie a sound solution.
There are two ends to be attained in dealing with the hearing officer
problem, not only through revision of Section 11 but otherwise as well.
These are (1) the creation of methods of selecting, compensating, and
judging the performance of hearing officers which will maintain the best-
qualified corps of examiners4 possible and (2) the establishment of
principles and methods applicable to the work of these officers that will
be most conducive to the proper performance of their duties. These two
ends are interrelated, since obviously the quality of personnel obtainable
will be determined in part by the conditions of worl which are offered
and these, in turn, must be adapted to the type of officials provided.
Two significant recent reports5 illuminate the hearing officer problem
by relating it to the entire organized movement to enhance the fairness
of federal administrative procedure, which began with the creation in
1933 of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Adminis-
trative Law and culminated in the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946.6 That movement's avowed goal has been to
secure objectivity of judgment and good-faith application of statutory
provisions to private interests on the part of administrative agencies. 7
4 The designation of the officials who are under discussion as "hearing officers," "exam-
iners," or persons given other titles has varied. Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure
Act designates them as examiners. The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) refers to them
variously as hearing officers and hearing commissioners. The Draft Report, supra note 2,
refers ordinarily to hearing officers but occasionally to hearing examiners. A still greater
variety of titles prevails among the several agencies which employ Section 11 examiners.
Id. at C-1-C-34.
5 Draft Report, supra note 2, 6-17; Lloyd D. Musolf, Federal Examiners and the Con-
flict of Law and Administration 35-46 (1952).
6 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1952). In the account of the legislative
history of the Administrative Procedure Act compiled by the Senate Committee on the
judiciary and published as Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Seas. (1946), the formal
background of the bill which became the Act is traced at p. 63 by C. A. Miller, a witness
before the House Committee, to its origin in the American Bar Association and in the
introduction, also in 1933, by Senator Norris of a bill to establish a United States Court of
Administrative justice. See also American Bar Association, Special Committee on Admin-
istrative Law, Legislative Proposal on Federal Administrative Procedure, at 4 (1944).
Senator Norris had originally introduced a bill for an administrative court in 1929. See
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950).
7 Good faith pursuit of this goal involves acceptance, for the purpose in hand, of the
legislative ends which the agencies are established to serve. See C. A. Miller, speaking in
behalf of the bill which became the Federal Administrative Procedure Act at a Public Forum
of the Federal Bar Association, March 30, 1945, 12 J.D.C. Bar Ass'n 361, 367 (1945):
"There is a very distinct difference between urging needed reforms of administrative pro-
cedure and urging procedures which will hamstring the government." Indications that those
who have taken strong positions on problems of administrative procedure have sometimes
been motivated by ulterior considerations do not detract from the need for as objective an
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For this purpose procedural safeguards and organizational changes have
been advocated and adopted. The reconciliation of these measures with
the requirements of administrative effectiveness is the fundamental re-
quirement in solving many specific problems. It underlies the solution to
the hearing officer problem.
The movement for further reform has centered upon greater "inde-
pendence" of hearing officers as an immediate goal. The thought behind
this proposal derives mainly from the conclusion of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941 that greater au-
thority and independence of status for hearing officers should be sought.8
This Conclusion became the basis of several of the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Failure to attain, in certain respects, the
objective of "independence" as it was formulated, albeit not too clearly,
by sponsors of the Act,9 accompanied by other deficiencies in the opera-
tion of Section 11,10 has produced the current demands for remedial
action.1 These demands are sometimes supported by reference to the
approach as possible. Cf. Final Report, Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941).
8 Final Report, supra note 7, at 43-55, 195-201, 238-245. James M. Landis had previ-
ously set forth a similar conclusion in his book, The Administrative Process at 103-105 (1938).
9 The Senate and House committee reports recommending passage of the McCarran-
Sumners bill which became the Administrative Procedure Act characterize the tenure and
compensation provisions of Section 11 as "designed to make examiners largely independent."
Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 6, at 215, 280. The
Senate report further states that "The purpose of this section is to render examiners secure
in their tenure and compensation." Id. at 215. Elsewhere in the same report the bill is said
to provide for "a special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers." Id. at 192.
In a later article and letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission the chief
Senatorial sponsor of the Act attributed to it the design "to make examiners a separate and
independent corps of hearing officers worthy of judicial traditions" and to make them,
"[o]n paper at least . . . very nearly the equivalent of judges, albeit operating within the
federal system of administrative justice." Hon. Pat McCarran, "Three Years of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act-A Study in Legislation," 38 Geo. L.J. 575, 582-583
(1950); Sen. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). In Senator McCarran's opinion the
design of the Act in this regard had not been realized and additional legislation might
become necessary. Ibid. Later he introduced S. 1708, 83d Cong., supra note 3, the "basic
objective" of which, according to the committee which recommended its passage by the
Senate, was "to achieve a completely independent corps of hearing examiners." Sen. Rep.
No. 2199, 83d Cong., supra note 3. In the Supreme Court's interpretation of the present
Act, it is designed to give effect to the conclusion of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure that "Creation of independent hearing commissioners insulated
from all phases of a case other than hearing and deciding will . . . go far toward solving
this problem [of commingled functions of investigation, advocacy, and deciding] at the level
of the initial hearing provided the proper safeguards are established to assure the insulation."
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 (1950).
10 Reports, "Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers," supra note 2, passim.
11 Supra note 3.
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analogy of the judiciary, 2 giving evidence of a belief that hearing officer
independence should approximate that of judges.
13
As a basis for dealing with the present hearing officer problem, it is
important to consider realistically the position occupied by these officers,
including the extent to which it resembles that of the judge, and its rela-
tion to the proper functioning of the agencies the hearing officers serve.
II. THE POSITION OF THE HEARING OFFICER
Like trial judges, hearing officers in formal administrative proceed-
ings' 4 preside at hearings where evidence is introduced and arguments
are made and on the basis of which conclusions of fact and of law will be
reached. There are, however, important aspects of the judge's position
12 Both S. 1708 and H.R. 9035, supra note 3, specifically provide that hearing officers
shall be "administrative judges." The Federal Trial Examiners' Conference from the
beginning took the view that hearing officers should be regarded as "an administrative
judiciary made up of men of the highest obtainable judicial caliber, with full independence
of decisional action, and the maximum of security in tenure and compensation." J. Earl
Cox, "Resume of Hearing Examiner Conference Activities," 19 I.C.C. Practitioners' J. 974
(1952). The Conference, however, did not endorse Presidential appointment of hearing
officers. Transcript of Hearings, Comm. on Hearing Officers, Pres. Conf. Ad. Proc. 989-1001
(1954) (testimony of Everett F. Haycraft, chairman of the Examiners' Conference). Of the
104 lawyers and law teachers who expressed their views to the Committee and whose
recommendations are summarized in Appendices H and I of the Draft Report of four
members of the Committee, supra note 2, 15 definitely invoked the analogy of the judiciary
which, according to four members of the Committee, was "constantly made" by those who
expressed their views. Id. at 3. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure may have initiated comparisons of hearing officers to judges by its statement
that "In general, the relationship upon appeal between the hearing commissioner and the
agency ought to a considerable extent to be that of trial court to appellate court." Final
Report, supra note 7, at 51.
13 "We believe that the hearing officer should be as independent and inaccessible in the
matter being heard as an upright judge would be in hearing a controversy in a court of
law." Statement of Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., chairman of the Spec. Comm. on Ad. Law, to
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 69 A.B.A. Rep. 439 (1944).
14 Formal administrative proceedings, as the expression is here used, means proceedings
leading to action which some governing law requires to be based on the record of a hearing.
The proceedings may be either rule-making or adjudication as defined in Section 2 of the
Fed. Ad. Proc. Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001. Sections 4 and 5 of that Act
require that the provisions of Sections 7 and 8, with certain additions which Section 5
attaches to adjudication, shall be observed in proceedings of this kind. These requirements
are of principal importance in determining the role which hearing officers play. Some
differentiation is made between rule-making and adjudication in this regard, and proceed-
ings on applications for initial licenses, although denominated adjudication, are assimilated
to rule-making in certain particulars for this purpose. These provisions of the Act are
discussed infra at p. 291-292. They have been supplemented and to some extent replaced by
stricter provisions, applicable to two leading agencies, by the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151! et seq. (1952), especially 29 U.S.C. § 154 as
amended, and the Communications Act amendments of 1952, 66 Stat. 711, 47 U.S.C. § 153
et seq., especially 47 U.S.C. § 409 as amended.
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which are not applicable to that of the hearing officer. The judge is
master of the tribunal in which he sits, subject to understood principles
and governing statutes and, increasingly, to rules laid down by a superior
court. When the decision is by a jury, the responsibility for instructing
the jury and for controlling the processes by which evidence reaches it is
the judge's. When the judge makes the decision, it is his personal prod-
uct, based on the record and the applicable law and aided, as regards
relevant general information, by what the judge brings to his task or is
able to acquire by permissible inquiry of his own. 5 If the judge remains
within his proper province, there will be only such determinations of
policy involved in his action as are "interstitial" to determinations of
law, 6 except where, as in disposing of an offender or instructing a guard-
ian or receiver, he is required to exercise discretion. When he exercises
such an avowed discretion, the judge may take account of data which
have not been adduced at the trial.'
7
The administrative hearing officer, by constrast, is traditionally not
master of the tribunal in which he sits, but acts in place of an agency
that controls it. The agency, rather than he, has authority to direct the
proceedings before him within limits imposed by applicable statutes. The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act confers certain powers in the hear-
ing upon him'" and assures in cases of adjudication as defined in the Act,
except initial licensing, that he shall render either an initial decision or a
recommended decision; ' but the agency remains the repository of resid-
15 Judicial notice is well understood to embrace general knowledge which the judge
acquires by resort to recognized sources of information, as well as similar knowledge which he
already possesses. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 802 (1942). He may, upon occasion and
within proper limits, consult individuals who possess knowledge he needs and can properly
use. Davis, Administrative Law 487-497 (1951), citing Frank, J., dissenting, in Triangle
Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948), and the practice of Lord Mans-
field. See 12 Holdswortb, A History of English Law 526 (1938).
16 See generally Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949). Few legal
rules are mathematically precise. The process of determining whether situations not previously
covered do or do not come within particular rules possesses both logical and policy aspects.
17 The practice of using such data in sentencing offenders is reviewed and discussed in the
opinion of the Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
I8 Section 7(b) of the Act provides that, subject to the published rules of the agency and
within its powers, the hearing officer shall have authority to:
(1) administer oaths and affirmations, (2) issue subpoenas authorized by law, (3) rule
upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, (4) take or cause depositions to be
taken whenever the ends of justice would be served thereby, (5) regulate the course of
the hearing, (6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by
consent of the parties, (7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters, (8) make
decisions or recommended decisions in conformity with Section 8(a), and (9) take any
other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this Act.
60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1952).
19 Section 8(a) provides that the hearing officer "shall initially decide the case or the
1955]
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ual authority for both hearing and decision. That decision is one of the
means by which the agency discharges its responsibilities, and the hearing
officer must therefore be its "alter ego" in fulfilling his role. Thus, his
position is in some ways more analogous to that of a special master or
commissioner of a court,2" who ordinarily possesses no independent
authority,2 than to that of a judge. If he is to have greater independence
than a special master, the reasons for it must lie in specific considerations
applicable to the hearing officer's particular function. Those reasons and
the considerations that suggest limits to this independence lie, as would
be expected, in the nature of administrative agencies and of the work
they are called upon to do. Here, rather than in any analogies to non-
administrative functionaries, must be found the answer to the hearing
officer problem.
The report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure has set forth the characteristics of federal administrative
agencies and the reasons which have led to their establishment.22 Briefly
stated, the matter comes down to this: The satisfactory attainment of
legislatively-prescribed results under numerous statutes, especially in
modern times, has required the establishment of large, specialized organ-
izations to administer these statutes. These organizations are capable of
exercising initiative in enforcement; of giving continuous, coordinated
attention to the matters with which they are concerned; and of exercising
an informed discretion when necessary. Many types of matters are han-
dled by these organizations or agencies. Some of them, such as the dis-
agency shall require (in specific cases or by general rule) the entire record to be certified to
it for initial decision;" but:
[wlhenever the agency makes the initial decision without having presided at the recep-
tion of the evidence, such officer shall first recommend a decision except that in rule
making or determining applications for initial licenses (1) in lieu thereof the agency may
issue a tentative decision or any of its responsible officers may recommend a decision or
(2) any such procedure may be omitted in any case in which the agency finds upon the
record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so
requires
60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1952).
20 Musolf, op. cit. supra note 5, 52-56. Such was the conception which the ICC had of its
corps of examiners, the first in the Federal Government. See Hearings before Committee on
the Judiciary on S. 674, 675 and 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 445-446 (1941) (testimony of
Commissioner Clyde B. Aitchison). See also Final Report, supra, note 7, at 24.
21 Rule 53 of the Fed. R. Civ. Proc., which embodies a modern conception of the duties of
a special master, authorizes the court's order of reference to specify or limit his powers in the
full discretion of the judge. When the judge does not limit his powers, the master's authority
at the hearing is similar to that of a hearing officer under the Fed. Ad. Proc. Act; and if he is
authorized to make findings of fact without limitation of their effect by the order of reference,
they are to be accepted by the court "unless clearly erroneous." That the order may deprive
his findings of weight, see Kycoga Land Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 110 F.2d 894
(6th Cir. 1940).
22 Final Report, supra note 7, c. I.
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position of numerous small claims for monetary benefits, require primarily
speed, accuracy, and uniformity of handling.23 Others, such as fixation
of utility rates and licensing of enterprises on the basis of public con-
venience and necessity, call for careful weighing of economic and social
considerations, including difficult considerations of policy.24 Still others,
such as the preservation of safety at sea, turn largely on technological
factors.25
When the hearing officer conducts a proceeding within an agency, he is
operating in the context of the agency's entire task. His conduct of the
proceeding and the action to which it leads form part of the flow of
agency business and will enhance or diminish the efficiency and wisdom
with which the agency discharges its functions. His actions, like those of
agency personnel who gather needed information, who determine what
matters to take up and what to postpone or ignore, or who dispose infor-
mally of a host of issues that never proceed to a hearing, must somehow
be guided by the agency's store of knowledge and its formulated policy.
The hearing officer must, at the same time, be in a position to contribute
personally as much as possible to the disposition of the case before him
and of others that may turn upon it.
Because the organization he serves is large, and because the dignity
and prestige of the presiding officer are essential to the satisfactory con-
duct of a hearing, the hearing officer must have adequate authority, sub-
ject to interlocutory appeals in some situations, to dispose of procedural
issues that arise, such as the admissibility of evidence, postponement of
sessions, and requests for intervention by additional parties. Conceivably
the special master or commissioner of a court might refer such matters to
the judge without too much loss of time or failure of understanding of the
situation presented.26 At most, the judge would be preoccupied with a
trial or with a small number of other cases which he had under considera-
tion. In an administrative agency, by contrast, the matter may have to
23 The Administrator of Social Security in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Veterans Administration handle matters of
this type.
24 The ICC, FPC, FCC, CAB and Packers and Stockyards Div. of the Dep't of Agr. deal
with issues of this sort.
25 The U.S. Coast Guard deals with marine safety. Similar functions with respect to safety
are performed by the agencies that regulate transportation.
20 In reality, the judicial framework is such that a special master would be unlikely to seek
aid from the judge except with the knowledge of the parties and opportunity for them to
participate in proceedings before the judge. "That courts may appoint auditors, investigators,
and examiners has never been known to and does not necessarily affect in the slightest degree
the rights of the parties to judicial hearings." In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d
798, 801 (7th Cir. 1937).
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be referred to supervisors in another city if the hearing is in the "field,"
and the officials to whom it goes may be absorbed in numerous other mat-
ters and may have no ready means of comprehending the problem pre-
sented. Delay and unwise action may result. This is one of the reasons
why the powers contained in Section 7 (b) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 7 have been bestowed.
The fact that at least some of the other personnel of an agency have
an interest-even though only an official one-in the outcome of pro-
ceedings is another reason why it is necessary that the hearing officer
have sufficient independence to secure objectivity in his rulings and con-
clusions. In this connection account must be taken of what is commonly
called the combination of prosecuting and judging in the same agency.
An agency, however, "prosecutes" in the criminal-law sense only if it
files charges and pursues them for the purpose of securing punishment.
In many proceedings it does neither; and in relatively few where it files
charges is punishment involved, even if license revocation and deporta-
tion of aliens are deemed to fall in this category.28 More commonly,
license issuance, the level of rates to be charged by a utility, the content
of a regulation, or the propriety and terms of a cease-and-desist order are
at stake. Nevertheless agency personnel who institute a proceeding,29
oppose an application, or present the agency's position at a hearing may
be psychologically committed to the point of view they have adopted. In
any event, the agency heads ordinarily are officially responsible for the
position taken by the agency in a proceeding before a hearing officer; and
other agency personnel may be committed, or may appear to be com-
mitted, to the same position. To "separate" the hearing officer from pos-
sible agency pressure so as to secure objective consideration of the
positions taken by other parties appearing before him seems essential to
a "fair hearing."
At the same time, to require an agency to submit its cause to a hearing
officer unarmed with the knowledge it possesses through its expert per-
sonnel and not charged by statute, as are the agency heads, with respon-
sibility for effectuating legislatively-prescribed ends, may weaken agency
effectiveness unless means are provided for integrating the hearing offi-
cer's performance into that of the agency. The agency's concern for
efficient discharge of its business, its expert knowledge pertinent to the
proceeding, and its established criteria for judging the issues must be
27 Supra note 18.
28 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d
421 (1954).
29 Frequently the agency is not the moving party and occupies the position of a tribunal
which is set in motion by others.
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communicated to him. The situation requires that this need be reconciled
with the need for hearing-officer "independence."
The traditional methods of both courts and administrative agencies are
relevant to the situation. The question arises whether the methods tradi-
tional to the judicial process, of offering information in the form of testi-
mony and presenting legal and policy considerations to the hearing by
means of enacted rules and open argument, do not suffice. If they do,
truly judicial independence of the hearing officer from the agency is ap-
propriate; for the agency has all of these means of communication avail-
able to it. Its agents may offer testimony and may argue orally and file
briefs in the proceeding. The hearing officer will be bound by any regula-
tions the agency may issue under its statutory authority. 30 His decision,
also, will be subject to correction by the agency heads upon review. What
more is needed, it may be asked?
The answer lies, in the eyes of some, in the "institutional method" of
arriving at decisions, which is stated to be characteristic of administrative
agencies and into which the hearing officer can be fitted. The "institu-
tional method," it has been said, involves "the cooperative effort of a
number of officers with the agency head," bringing to bear the "cumula-
tive efforts of specialized officers" and producing "a series of automatic
internal checks" by each officer upon the data and ideas the others con-
tribute.3 In this way a staff of engineers, lawyers, economists, account-
ants, and other specialists can work together in reaching conclusions.
The safeguards to persons who have interests at stake or who are other-
wise affected by the decisions an agency reaches in this manner lie in the
professional training and responsibility of the officers involved, in cross-
checking among them, and in the responsibility of the agency heads who
coordinate the entire operation, decide finally upon the result, and must
answer for all that transpires.
30 Even if the agency lacks power to issue regulations which have statutory force, it can
certainly promulgate binding instructions to its personnel, including hearing officers. The
governing statutes usually authorize the issuance of regulations necessary for their administra-
tion, and the power to do so is in any event conferred by the over-all statute which provides
that "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the
records, papers, and property appertaining to it." Rev. Stat. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22
(1952). Statements of law or policy in agency opinions operate with almost equal authority
thereafter, according to general testimony. See Davis, Administrative Law 545-547 (1951) ;
Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 231 (testimony of Examiner Charles E. Morgan),
881 (testimony of Rufus G. Poole). Such adherence to agency precedent is not inconsistent
with an occasional considered recommendation by a hearing officer that an applicable prec-
edent not be followed. See, e.g., id. at 1178 (testimony of Odell Kominers).
31 Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 Col. L. Rev. 589, 601
(1951). See also Davis, op. cit. supra note 30, c. 8.
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Outside of government, the preponderance of human affairs calling for
more than individual action is conducted by- a consultative method, with
or without professional participation. Business decisions are reached,
human ailments are diagnosed, and club and church problems are settled
in this manner. To only a slight extent are the methods of adjudication
applied, as they may be, for example, in the expulsion of an individual
from an organization or the dismissal of an employee from his job. In
government too, foreign policy, military affairs, and the management of
public enterprises and property go forward in the same way. Often vital
interests of people are at stake in what transpires, as they are, for in-
stance, in a decision whether to discontinue or move a business or where
to locate a park or highway or how much to charge for a service; yet it
is rarely suggested that the "hearing" of interested persons be attempted
in connection with such matters, or, if it is, that more than an interview
be accorded. Arguably, the same considerations as account for the ac-
ceptance of "institutional" methods in these contexts should point to their
possible use in licensing, rate fixing, and kindred operations 3 2-for which,
indeed, they were thought to suffice until relatively recently.3"
The use of formal hearings before hearing officers in agencies equipped
to employ institutional methods need not result in displacing those
methods altogether. Traditionally it has not done so, for the participa-
tion of agency staff members in the decisional process has continued
alongside of the hearing, through advice to the hearing officer or to other
officials who have rendered decisions. Since the end-product of such a
proceeding must be based upon the record of the hearing, however, it is
necessary that sufficient data to sustain that product be introduced as
32 See Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings 71-74 (1941).
33 Hearings akin to judicial trials were a rarity in the administration of statutes by
executive agencies until comparatively recently and are still the exception in numerous tradi-
tional areas of government, such as state and local licensing and property-tax collection. Ex-
tension of more formal procedures has taken place through a combination of administrative,
legislative, and judicial action. By this means, for example, the careful processes incident to
the regulation of public utilities have been evolved; yet as recently as 1933 three dissenting
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States thought that elimination of a grade
crossing at great expense to a railroad could constitutionally be ordered without opportunity
for a full hearing on the merits. Southern Railway Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
Starting with no express statutory provision for a hearing to be accorded to an alien and
with a provision that the administrative determination should be final, the courts in habeas
corpus actions succeeded in imposing procedural requirements which have now borne fruit in
the hearing provisions contained in 'Sections 101(b) (4) and 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 171, 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b) (4), 1252. Hecht v. Monaghan,
307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954), affords a recent example of extension of formal methods
into an area of administration where they were previously unknown. As the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure remarked regarding one aspect of the subject,
"the administrative process, far from being an encroachment upon the rule of law, is an
extension of it." Final Report, supra note 7, at 12.
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evidence; and it is clearly improper to withhold from the hearing any of
the evidence that is to be used, since the checks which the testimonial
process affords are intended to be applied. Agency staff members must
appear as witnesses and let their testimony be weighed against that of
others. To this extent the process of informal interchange among experts
gives way. Insofar, moreover, as the viewpoints of agency personnel are
brought to bear in written or oral argument at the hearing, the judicial
process substitutes for the institutional. The "record" of a hearing or
trial, however, does not conventionally include the argument and it is not
clear merely on the basis of the requirement that the decision be grounded
in the record that additional discussion may not take place in camera. In
any event, even a court may take judicial notice of pertinent general
knowledge and ought to take cognizance of applicable law, whether or
not it has been brought out at the hearings. So may a hearing officer; and
in the setting of an administrative agency he might be expected to seek
advice in these matters from qualified staff members.
The Administrative Procedure Act, in addition to conferring certain
authority upon the hearing officer during the proceeding before him,34
detracts from the institutional method of reaching decisions to the extent
of forbidding the hearing officer in any adjudication, except initial licens-
ing, to consult any person or party on any fact in issue except upon notice
and opportunity for all parties to participate35 and by providing that
agency personnel engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecut-
ing functions in any such case shall not render advice in that or a factu-
ally related case. 6 The further requirement as to adjudication, except
initial licensing, that the hearing officer prepare either an initial decision,
subject to review, or a recommended decision 7 tends to personalize his
role. The act provides further that hearing officers shall not be responsi-
ble to or subject to the supervision or direction of agency personnel en-
gaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions; 8 it
provides for the appointment of hearing officers "by and for each agency,
subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent
with this Act;" it requires that hearing officers shall be assigned to cases
in rotation so far as practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as examiners; it renders hearing
officers "removable by the agency in which they are employed only for
good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission
34 Supra note 18.
35 Section 5(c) of the Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
36 Ibid.
37 Supra note 19.
38 Section 5(c), supra note 35.
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...after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof;" and it
provides that hearing officers "shall receive compensation prescribed by
the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings and
in accordance with the Classification Act," except that agency efficiency
ratings shall not be given."
Such is the extent of the present statutory separation of hearing offi-
cers from the institutional context of their agencies; such is the statutory
"Independence" conferred upon them. The problem to be solved is
whether changes should made in these provisions or their administration
in order to secure greater objectivity and fairness of agency action.
III. THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY AND PROFICIENCY
The proponents of administrative procedure reform have tended to
justify their proposals by reference to theoretical considerations. The
separation of governmental powers, 40 the traditional rule of law,4' and
more recently the methods of the judiciary have served as norms against
which to measure the performance of administrative agencies and by
which to fashion measures of improvement. Yet men seldom are moved
by theories of government except in response to needs which these theo-
ries serve;" and the effort to improve administrative procedure does not
provide an exception. Underlying it has been a deep-felt sense of need to
check possible injustice to private interests on the part of government
agencies charged with carrying out statutory policies.43 The fear that
39 Sec. 11, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952). Section 11 reads in pertinent part:
Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this Act,
there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent exam-
iners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to sections 7 and 8, who shall be
assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the
agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by
the Civil Service Commission . . . after opportunity for hearing and upon the record
thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independ-
ently of agency recommendations or ratings and in accordance with the Classification
Act.... Agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners
selected by the Commission from and with the consent of other agencies. For the pur-
poses of this section, the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require
reports by agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress, pro-
mulgate rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recommend
legislation, subpoena witnesses or records, and pay witness fees as established for the
United States courts.
40 Rep. Spec. Comm. Ad. Law, 58 A.B.A. Rep. 407, 409-411 (1933).
41 Rep. Spec. Comm. Ad. Law, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 331, 339-342, 356-359 (1938).
42 Illustrative is the shifting adherence all during United States history of political parties,
geographical areas, and economic groups to the doctrines of, on the one hand, states' rights
and, on the other hand, strong national government.
43 The combination of "prosecuting" and "judging" functions is often attributed to such
agencies. More accurately (see supra p. 288), Chief Justice Groner referred at one point to
the need of separating the function of "enforcing a regulatory subject" from that of "passing
judgment upon the alleged violation thereof." Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 1363.
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such agencies may become careless of private rights or disregardful of
them is widespread and persistent. The theory of separation of powers
is not without application to administrative action today;4 4 but it is of
little aid in devising means to secure fair determinations by administra-
tive agencies. Retention by the legislature of its essential *function of
prescribing the basic law, which the separation of powers requires, still
allows such broad discretion to be conferred upon administrators in spe-
cific matters as to leave open the possibility of arbitrary action.4" Judi-
cial review of administrative action, on the other hand, seldom extends
to the merits of what has been done.4" Something more is needed if
objectivity and fairness in administrative determinations are to be for-
mally secured.
The institutional method which administrative agencies can employ
and the expertness of much of their personnel provide certain protections
of their own against abuse, as has been pointed out above. Yet experts,
like the rest of us, all too often have feet of clay; and institutional
methods, operating in camera, are or appear to be susceptible to manip-
ulation. The philosophy of decency in government insists that effective
means should be provided in some manner for bringing administrative
operations into the open and for securing objectivity of decisions when
vital private interests are at stake.47 This practical need for a check,
44 The Supreme Court's rejection of the claim of inherent Presidential power to seize con-
trol of an industry, at least when the nation is not formally at war, affords a recent illustra-
tion. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), holding that the infliction of infamous punishment for an
offense must be effected through the judiciary.
45 Mr. Justice Roberts' demonstration of the pliability of a typical statutory "standard"
governing an economic regulatory power-in the particular case, the power to set maximum
prices-is logically convincing, even if it does not settle the constitutional issue presented.
Dissenting opinion, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 448 (1944). The fiction that a
verbal standard is necessary was virtually dropped in Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742 (1948). That there are nevertheless standards and norms, derived from our entire
culture, which control the administrator exercising broad powers, see Wyzanski, "The Trend
of the Law and Its Impact on Legal Education," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 558, 560-561 (1944),
reprinted in Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law, Cases and Comments 55 (1954), Cf.
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Part I at 7 (1931).
46 The practical and constitutional limitations upon the feasible scope of judicial review of
administrative action were effectively summarized in 1941 by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 27
A.B.A.J. 209-210 (1941). Cf. the same authority's objections to the resulting state of affairs,
recently expressed in Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-
Day Significance 129-133 (1953).
47 The classical statement of the nature of an administrative agency, which frequently
causes it not to satisfy this demand, is that of Dean G. Acheson, Chairman, Att'y Gen.
Comm. Ad. Proc.:
[T]he agency is one great obscure organization with which the citizen has to deal. It is
absolutely amorphous. He pokes it in one place and it comes out another. No one seems
to have specific authority. There is someone called the commission, the authority; a
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rather than objections to the combination of theoretically separate func-
tions, is the chief basis today of demands for reform.48 Opportunity for
hearing provides the obvious safeguard; but it succeeds only to the extent
that the ensuing decisions actually rest upon the hearing and register
objective judgments.
The independent regulatory agency employing the hearing device and
responsible directly to Congress49 is itself a device for securing objectiv-
metaphysical omniscient brooding thing which sort of floats around in the air and is
not a human being. That is what is baffling.
Hearings on S. 674, 675, and 918 (1941), supra note 20, at p. 807.
48 Some indication that this is so is present in the procedural provisions of the Labor-
Management Relations Act. Under that Act the "prosecuting" functions with respect to unfair
labor practices have been taken from the National Labor Relations Board and vested in the
General Counsel. The Board retains only the adjudicating function; yet the Act's restrictions
upon consultation by hearing officers and by the Board itself in reaching decisions are more
stringent than those of the Administrative Procedure Act. See infra, p. 323. However, the
separation-of-functions provisions of the Labor-Management Act were an awkward compro-
mise, as is indicated by the failure to separate the General Counsel from the Board in name
as well as in fact and by inadequate provisions for the General Counsel to obtain his own
subordinate personnel or for the Board to secure independent legal advice. Informal arrange-
ments were made, with some difficulty, to overcome these deficiencies. See Davis, op. cit.,
supra note 30, at 411; H. Rep. No. 1852, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1950). In any case,
distrust of the new adjudicative Board may be a carry-over from controversies under the
predecessor National Labor Relations Act. There is much evidence that these controversies
gave strong impetus to the entire movement for administrative procedure reform. See the
agreement to this effect on the part of Senator O'Mahoney and Acting Attorney General
Francis Biddle at the Hearings on S..674, 675, and 918, supra note 20, at 1433. It is further
true that the present Board and its trial examiners do not have the same need of advice from
technical experts as does, for example, the Federal Communications Commission.
49 The responsibility of the independent agencies directly to Congress does not exclude a
measure of responsibility to the President also. See generally Redford, Administration of
National Economic Control 275-283, 286 (1952) ; Cole, Presidential Influence on Independent
Agencies, 221 Annals 72-77 (1942); Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions
225-226, 679-688 (1941); Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Hoover Commission), Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions (Appen-
dix N to the principal Report), 12-17 (1949). The annual budgets of these agencies, as of
others, must clear through the Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent. Budget and Accounting Act, §§ 201, 207, 213, 42 Stat. 20, 22, 23 (1921) as amended,
31 U.S.C. §§ 11, 16, 21 (1952). The agency members are uniformly appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms ranging from 5 to 14 years and
overlapping in a manner which normally delays a President's appointment of a majority of
the members of an agency until late in his four-year term. See Task Force Report, supra at
13. The members are removable by the President for cause or in his discretion, depending on
the terms of the governing statute. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935). More recently, through the exercise of his power under the Reorganization Act of
1949, the President has obtained authority to designate the chairmen of all the "independent"
agencies as to which he had not received this authority by statute, except the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. Reorganization Plans No. 8, 9, and 10 of 1950, 5 U.S.C. pp. 161-163
(1952). This change was recommended in the Task Force Report, supra at 31-33, in the
interest of greater efficiency and improved coordination with the Chief Executive. Cf. Cush-
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ity in administrative determinations, along with vigor and proficiency. 0
Such an agency is designed to exclude political or economic influences
such as might otherwise determine its decisions. In place of these bases
of decision the agency is expected to substitute its resources of knowl-
edge and expert judgment, plus the data and arguments supplied in nego-
tiations or adduced at hearings by persons with whom it deals. 1 Such
a body's operations, however, are less subject to surveillance from outside
than those of a departmental agency which can be called to account by
the chief executive. Hence if abuses creep in, they may go uncorrected.
All specialized agencies, moreover, whether independent or departmental,
develop stores of information and. methods of operation which because
of their detailed and technical character are difficult for outsiders to com-
prehend or comment upon. Therefore, insofar as safeguards upon the use
of such an agency's methods are required they must be specially devised.
man, op. cit. supra, 748. Presidents exercise leadership or suasion with respect to independent
agencies from time to time to bring their policies into line with the Executive's own. See,
e.g., Cushman, op. cit. supra, 249-257 (Shipping Board and Presidents Harding and Coolidge);
id. at 295-296, and Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest 153-156 (1936)
(Federal Power Commission and President F.' D. Roosevelt) ; The Problem of the Inde-
pendent Regulatory Commissions, in Report, Pres. Comm. Ad. Mgt. at 220-221 (1937)
(Interstate Commerce Commission and President Hoover). Cf. Herring, op. cit. supra, at
135-138. Resignations from several of the agencies have been frequent, producing a turnover
of membership which has greatly enhanced the President's opportunity to influence the
agency through the appointing power. Task Force Report, supra, at 24. Certain types of
agency orders which have an especially close relationship to foreign affairs, the over-all
economy, or the expenditure of federal funds are subject to Presidential approval. Id. at 14-15.
50 Expertness and vigor were more stressed when the Interstate Commerce Commission
was established than the objectivity to which its independence might be expected to con-
tribute. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Part I, 286-287 (1931). Quasi-
judicial detachment was sought as an accompanying virtue in the Federal Trade Com-
mission and later agencies. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 19 (1924) ; Cushman,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 177-181, 188-190, 305, 341. Objectivity has been especially stressed in
later discussions of the quality of an independent agency's work and of the conditions necessary
to satisfactory performance. Board of Investigation and Research, Report on Practices and
Procedures of Governmental Control, H. R. Doc. No. 678, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1944);
Sharfman, op. cit. supra, Part IV, 257-274 (1937); Robinson, "The Hoch-Smith Resolution
and the Interstate Commerce Commission," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1929); Hoover Com-
mission Task Force Report, supra note 49, at 28. This objectivity may be impaired by
undesirable Congressional influence as an accompaniement to proper legislative oversight, pro-
vision of funds, and Senatorial scrutiny of nominees for agency membership, taking the form
of either unofficial pressure from legislators, restriction of appropriations, or (although rarely)
formal directives which invade agency discretion without affording a genuine guide to action.
See Comm. on Ad. Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., "Report on Congressional
Oversight of Administrative Agencies," 5 The Record 11 (1950); Robinson op. cit. supra;
Mansfield, "The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Consideration of Commercial Condition5 in
Rate Fixing," 16 Cornell L.Q. 339 (1931) ; Task Force Report, supra, at 37-38.
51 Sharfman, op. cit. supra note 50, Part IV, 259-263, quoting Commissioners Balthasar H.
Meyer and Joseph B. Eastman.
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The independent regulatory agencies are sometimes charged with de-
ficiencies, alleged to be characteristic, which impair the advantages these
agencies are supposed to confer and call for remedy. To some extent,
these agencies are criticized for failing to hold the balance among the
interests they affect, and for yielding to considerations which are not
fully disclosed and are only remotely amenable to evidence or argu-
ment.52 The independent agencies have also been criticized for inade-
quacy to their tasks and lack of that very vigor and specialized proficiency
which were among the reasons for their creation.5 3 Administrative delays
have also drawn criticism. 4 According to some observers, the judicial
process does not suffer by comparison with the methods of the independ-
ent agencies when judged by end-results. 5
52 An oft-repeated charge against the NLRB in its early years was that it was unduly
favorable to unions. Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946) ; H. Rep. No. 3109,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 149 (1941). At present the Board is sometimes accused of the opposite
tendency. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1954, § 1, p. 74. The CAB, in the midst of a bitter
struggle between certificated air transport carriers and non-scheduled operators, has been
regarded as tender toward the former. See Jaffe, "The Effective Limits of the Regulatory
Process: A Reevalbation," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110-1113, 1121-1123 (1954); Durham,
"How Not to Regulate Air Transportation," 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 105 (1950). The
FCC is similarly looked upon by some as favoring large as against small interests in radio
and television. Weaver and Cooley, "Competition in the Broadcasting of Ideas and Entertain-
ment: Shall Radio Take Over Television," 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 721 (1953). Even the long-
revered ICC has not escaped condemnation as "railroad minded." Jaffe, op. cit. supra, at
1108-1109, and works cited. To an uncertain extent, obviously, allegations hostile to the
agencies stem from the natural bitterness of disappointed interests. Inevitably there will be
such interests in relation to any contested matter. The belief that there is tenderness toward
established interests, however, need not rest on charges of sinister influence or corruption by
persons involved. It may be enough, for example, that naturally, in the long run and by and
large, agency members "will be responsive to plans for making business life more orderly and
secure through integration and price regulation. Unplanned and ruthless commercial rivalry
will be distasteful to them." Schwartz, "Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries, An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436, 474 (1954).
Jaffe, op. cit. supra, at 1107-1129, 1134, identifies a variety of reasons for so-called "industry
mindedness" on the part of agency members, including the tendency identified by Schwartz
and a sense of hesitancy to curb enterprise drastically where the financial risks continue to
rest upon regulated interests. See generally Paul H. Douglas, Ethics in Government 33-35
(1952).
53 Paul H. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 52, at 29-30. See also Board of Investigation and
Research, Report on Practices and Procedures of Governmental Control, supra note 50, at
26-27.
54 Pres. Conf. Ad. Proc., First Report 1-2 (1953) ; Judicial Conference of the United States
Report of Proceedings 25-26 (1951) ; Rep. judicial Conf. Advisory Comm., 19 I.C.C. Prac. 3.
4 (1951); Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, Antitrust Law
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice-A Preliminary Report, H. R. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1951). See
Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit. supra note 50, 88-118; "A Forum on Ad-
ministrative Procedure," 21 I.C.C. P'rac. J. 822, 833-843 (1954); Final Report, supra note
7, 61, 327-374.
55 Schwartz, op. cit. supra, note 52, at 458-463, 471-475; Transcript of Hearings, supra,
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It is natural to consider whether improvement in the over-all perform-
ance of the agencies might ensue if somehow an able, fair-minded official,
removed from pressures and capable of employing judicial methods to
advantage, could be given a commanding role in the administrative proc-
ess, thus serving as a check upon agency deficiencies. Attention natu-
rally focuses on the hearing officer in this connection. 6 Hence, to some
extent, advocacy of increased effectiveness in the service of the public
interest reinforces the demand from private interests for better treatment
in directing attention to the hdaring officer problem. That problem turns
to a considerable extent on the provisions of Section 11 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, to which so much attention has been given of late,
and on the kind of administration these provisions receive.
IV. HEARING OFFICER PERSONNEL PROBLEMS
The interpretation of certain provisions of Section 11 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act which are summarized above57 has been settled by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam-
iners Conference,5 8 which sustained the applicable regulations of the
Civil Service Commission in all of the respects in which they had been
attacked. 9 However, the questions of personnel policy which underlay
note 12, 1066, 1097 (testimony of Honorable Douglas L. Edmonds); Hearings before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 84,
194-195 (1951) (testimony of F.C.C. Commissioner Robert F. Jones); Rosenblum v. FT C,
214 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion of Clark, J.). See also Adams v. Railroad
Retirement Board, 214 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1954).
56 Hearings on S. 674, 675, and 918, supra note 20, 1125-1126 (testimony of Herbert M.
Bingham):
If ... any case can be taken from the hearing officer at the will of the [Federal Com-
munications] Commission, immediately upon the conclusion of the submission of evidence
... i]n difficult cases and those fraught with political implications temptation will exist
to relieve the hearing officer of making determinations in such cases and the agency
through an anonymous staff member can develop findings enforcing the agency's
predilections .... Under such circumstances the initial factual finding comes out, not
as the independent finding of the hearing officer, but as a part of the proposed findings
of the Commission.
Mr. Bingham did not explain why the Commission should be expected to have predilections
of such a nature that they should be excluded from the proposed findings in a proceeding
before it; but the agency's inability to demonstrate in its decisions that it was adhering to
consistent policies may have stimulated suspicion. See Warner, "The Administrative
Process of the Federal Communications Commission," 19 So. Calif. L. Rev. 191, 312 (1946).
That the same inability continues see Rep. Comm. on Communications, Ad. Law Sec., Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n (mimeographed, 1954).
57 Supra note 39.
58 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
59 The pervading issue was whether the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act to
free hearing officers more largely from agency influence should, in the disputed particulars,
prevail over a more literal interpretation of Section l1's subjection of hearing officer person-
nel administration "to the civil service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this
Act" and its provision for the compensation of hearing officers according to the Classification
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the legal controversy, together with other questions that have been raised,
remain for solution. These questions include: (1) the appropriate salary
level for hearing officers; (2) the desirability of having more than one
grade of position in an agency; (3) the scope to be allowed to agency
discretion in determining the means by which vacant positions are to be
filled; (4) the proper methods of assigning hearing officers to cases; and
(5) the desirability of permitting reduction-in-force procedures to apply
to hearing officers.
A. Hearing Officer Salaries
The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure recently de-
clined to recommend the establishment of a single grade of hearing-officer
position in each agency as advocated unanimously by its eight-member
Committee on Hearing Officers. It adopted instead a recommendation
that the Civil Service Commission continue to maintain in each agency
"cone or more salary grades, taking into account the diversity of the
agency's functions, the desirability of minimizing the administration of
promotions, and the possible utility of recruiting examiners at lower
grades and increasing their compensation as, through increased experience
and competence, they perform increasingly responsible work." 0 Compen-
sation of examiners as incumbents of positions in the higher grades of the
Classification Act, with a range of annual salaries between $8300, the
minimum for Grade GS-13, to $11,800, the maximum for GS-15, was rec-
ommended "until higher grades are available under the Classification
Act." 61 Four members of the Committee had recommended a range
between $12,000 and $14,000 among agencies; the other four had recom-
mended accepting the Classification Act range, subject to future in-
crease.62 A suggestion to the Committee had been that hearing officers'
salaries be slightly (i.e., approximately $1,000 a year) below those of
agency heads; but it was also contended that from the standpoint of
sound agency administration these salaries should not be above those of
the principal staff officers, such as bureau heads, under the Classification
Act. Three justices dissented from the decision, which reversed the result in the District
Court, 104 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1952), and the Court of Appeals, 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(one judge dissenting). The Supreme Court's position avoids a strained construction of
Section 11 except, perhaps, as to the application of reduction-in-force procedures to hearing
officers. Critical comment has been divided. See 4 De Paul L. Rev. 1 (1954); 28 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1311 (1953); [1953] U. Ill. L. Forum 467; 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 38, 198 (1952);
101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142 (1952).
60 Minutes, Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday, October 15, 1954, p. 7 (mimeographed).
61 Ibid. The minimum salary for Grade GS-13 is actually $8360. 63 Stat. 965 (1949), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (1952).
62 Recommendations on the Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers (mimeo-
graphed, September 8, 1954), Recommendation No. 4.
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Act.63 Bills introduced into the 83d Congress provided for a flat, Govern-
ment-wide hearing-officer salary of $14,000 a year.64
The argument that the level of hearing-officer compensation should
not exceed that of the principal staff officers within an agency seems con-
vincing, on the assumption that hearing officers will continue to function
on behalf of the agencies they serve.0 5 Outstanding as the qualities they
should possess are,66 these qualifications can hardly be said to exceed in
significance or value those that should be present in certain other officials,
such as those whose function it is to direct the engineering, economic, or
legal aspects of an agency's work, to guide the negotiation of many de-
terminations for each one that reaches an agency's hearing officers, or to
direct the agency's presentation of all of the proceedings that reach this
stage. There is honor enough and recognition enough of the hearing
,officers' independent contributions if their salary status rises to that on
the highest staff level. More would produce an imbalance hard to defend.
On this point the President's Conference seems on sound ground.
B. Grades of Hearing Officer Positions and Related Problems
The question whether there should be more than one grade of hearing
officer within an agency involves several difficult considerations, such as
whether formal proceedings in an agency may actually fall into several
distinguishable ranges of difficulty; whether, if they do, the cases can be
classified in advance so as to permit assignment to hearing officers in
corresponding salary grades; whether, even so, each proceeding deserves
the same grade of examiner as every other; whether a system of more
than one grade can be so manipulated by an agency as to endanger the
independence which the Administrative Procedure Act endeavors to
secure to hearing officers; and whether the strains incident to a system
of promotions from one grade to another are worth undergoing for the
sake of whatever benefit may result.
The first point, whether proceedings within an agency may fall into
63 Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, 486, 520, 796.
64 S. 1708 and H.R. 9035, supra note 3. The salary of district court judges is now $15,000,
28 U.S.C. § 135 (1952); that of members of the regulatory commissions is the same, 63
Stat. 880-881 (1949).
65 The question here is independent of the question whether the hearing officers should be
employed by these agencies or by a central administration, which is discussed infra at p. 319.
In either event they would function on behalf of agency heads in the cases they heard.
An administrative court, before which agencies were required to present their cases for
initial decision, would establish a contrasting arrangement not here involved.
66 There seems to have been no dissent during the intervening years from the view ex-
pressed by the Attorney General's Committee that "These officials should be men of ability
and prestige, and should have a tenure and salary which will give assurance of independence
of judgment." Op. cit. supra note 7, at 46.
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different categories of difficulty, necessarily works out differently in the
various agencies. Agencies which deal with several distinct kinds of sub-
ject matter may develop proceedings with correspondingly different
grades of difficulty, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board's safety and
economic proceedings.6 7 Licensing, rate, and cease-and-desist proceed-
ings involving the same enterprises, obviously differ according to the com-
plexity of the issues presented, the number of parties involved, and the
character of determinations to be made. It seems probable that on the
whole, as an experienced commentator concluded, proceedings in these
categories within a particular area of subject matter are likely to present
only two separable degrees of difficulty-the relatively simple, involving
one or a few issues with a small number of parties, and the relatively
difficult, involving either many issues or many parties or both. 8 Whether
the cases possessing each degree of difficulty can be recognized in a pre-
liminary stage, at the time hearing officers are assigned to them, is an-
other question which varies from agency to agency. Certificate of con-
venience and necessity cases probably can be separated at that stage into
simple local and complex regional proceedings. Rate cases may be sim-
ilarly classifiable, and trade-practice cease-and-desist proceedings may
be grouped according to the scope of the market operations involved.
Interventions in even an apparently simple proceeding may be unex-
pectedly numerous, however, and a few clear issues in a case involving
only a small number of parties may turn out to be forbiddingly tech-
nical.69 In practice an agency may prefer not to make the effort to dis-
tinguish among cases in advance. Paitly as a result, there is a strong
tendency toward uniformity in the work. assigned to hearing officers
within the various agencies. Consequently thirteen agencies now have only
one grade of hearing officer and no agency has more than three grades.70
The argument which has been made, 71 that all proceedings deserve the
67 Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 785 (testimony of CAB officials). The duties
of hearing officers in three bureaus of the ICC, the largest employer of hearing officers in
the Government, are also kept separate. Id. at 157 (testimony of Wilson Matthews, Ex-
aminer in charge of hearing officers for the Civil Service Commission.)
68 Woodall, "The Appointment and Compensation of Federal Hearing Officers," 10 Fed.
B.J. 391, 405 (1949). See also Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S.
128, 134 (1953): Petitioners point out that "certain cases before the Interstate Commerce
Commission involve relatively simple applications for extensions of motor carrier certificates,
while others involve complicated and difficult railroad rate proceedings." Mr. Matthews in his
testimony, supra note 67, at 138, gave it as his personal view, based on long experience with
the problem, that two grades of examiner positions in each agency, one of which would be
of a "trainee type," would provide the best solution.
69 See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
70 Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, 28-29, 38-39; Draft Report, supra note 2,
25-29 and Appendix D.
71 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 78, J-9.
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same grade of hearing officer because the human interests involved should
have the same quality of attention, wears the aura of democratic due
process; but it overlooks an essential distinction. It is true that all pro-
ceedings, great and small, are entitled to the same conscientiousness and
integrity on the part of the deciding officer; but it does not follow that
all require this officer to possess the same proficiency. If it did, justices
of the peace would have to possess the same qualifications as United
States district judges and should receive the same compensation. All
district judges, it is true, receive the same salaries, although the character
of their case load may vary widely; but the reasons lie in administrative
considerations and in a policy of preserving the independence and pres-
tige of the office72 rather than in the rights of litigants to the same quality
of treatment. Conscientiousness and integrity must be sought in all areas
of life and of government; differences of compensation result from va-
riations in the proficiency required and from other factors not relevant
here.
73
The possibility of an employing agency's manipulating the grade classi-
fication of hearing officers where more than one grade exists, so as to
endanger their independence, stems from the practicalities and not from
the theory of classification. That theory is simple, although often mis-
understood. The duties of a position are determined by the employing
agency. By their nature, when matched against the classification stand-
ards established by the Civil Service Commission,74 these duties deter-
mine the statutory salary grade into which the position falls and the
range of compensation, assigned by the statute, which an incumbent may
receive.7 1 Within that range, authorized statutory salary increases may
occur periodically. 76 These, except in the case of hearing officers, depend
upon length of service and the efficiency ratings accorded by the employ-
ing agencies; 77 but hearing officers, because of the prohibition in Section
11 of the Administrative Procedure Act against the use of efficiency
72 See Hearings on S. 674, 675, and 918, supra note 20, at 835 (statement of Dean G.
Acheson).
73 The Classification Act provides that:
[Tihe principle of equal pay for substantially equal work shall be followed and ...
variations in rates of basic compensation paid to different officers and employees shall
be in proportion to substantial differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and qualifica-
tion requirements of the work performed....
63 Stat. 954 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 1071 (1952).
74 63 Stat. 957 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 1094 (1952).
75 63 Stat. 957-958 (1949), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1092, 1101-1103 (1952).
76 63 Stat. 959-965 (1949), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1112-1113 (1952).
77 63 Stat. 967-968 (1949), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1122 (1952).
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ratings,78 receive their increases on the basis of length of service alone.79
The grade of a position, if it has been properly classified, cannot be
changed so long as its duties remain the same. Promotion, therefore, is
dependent upon the existence of a vacancy in a position of higher grade
to which the incumbent can be shifted. If an error in classification has
been made or the duties of a position change, the Civil Service Commis-
sion may assign the position to the proper grade;8 ° and if it does so, the
compensation of the incumbent will change accordingly, provided he
remains in the position.
There is room for a great deal of variation between this theory and
real life, however. Positions may exist on paper but be unfilled over
periods of time for budgetary or other reasons and then be filled again.
The same type of work may in some situations be allocated to positions
which are in different grades because other, accompanying duties are
different. The verbal standards for measuring duties and assigning posi-
tions to grades are necessarily somewhat artificial.8" The entire scheme
is obviously a conceptual one, imposed upon complex and shifting actu-
78 Supra note 39.
79 Hearing Examiner Regulations of the Civil Service Commission, 16 Fed. Reg. 9626
(1951), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.10(b).
80 63 Stat. 958 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 1103 (1952).
81 The Civil Service Commission has been much criticized for the allegedly unrealistic and
unworkable nature of the classification standards which it has maintained for hearing-officer
positions. Opinion of the District Court, Federal Trial Examiners Conference v. Ramspeck,
104 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1952) ; dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court, Ramspeck v. Federal
Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1952). The opinion in the District Court sets
forth the standards in important part. See also, Draft Report, supra note 2, 20-24, where,
in addition, the Commission's procedure in arriving at these standards is outlined. As the
majority opinion in the Supreme Court brings out, the terminology which has been most
criticized is based on criteria prescribed in the Classification Act itself. 63 Stat. 959 (1949),
5 U.S.C. § 1112 (1952). Any effort to imprison complex and variable factors within a
formula is almost certain to yield a product that will seem arbitrary and unrealistic, and
no one seems to have suggested a better set of standards than the Commission's, except for
the suggestions of the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure that "less techni-
cal and simpler language" be used and that "language that erroneously suggests that length
of record is of some importance" be deleted. Minutes, Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday,
October 15, 1954, at 7. The second of these suggestions relates to a feature of the standards
that tends to exclude from consideration the need for skill by an examiner in limiting the
size of records and in effecting settlements, which seems unwise. See Report, September 3,
1954, supra note 2, at 37; Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 1002-1004 (testimony
of Everett 0. Haycraft, Trial Examiner with the Federal Trade Commission and chairman
of the Federal Trial Examiners Conference). The Commission has given diminishing weight
to the size-of-record factor in classifying positions. Id. at 1253-1257. The real question
surrounding the standards is not their wording but whether the attempt should have been
made to differentiate five different grades of positions involving the-duties of hearing officers.
Such was the grade pattern when the Administrative Procedure Act became effective, how-
ever. No one raised specific objection to it before the Commission at that time. Ramspeck
v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1952); Brief for Petitioners, 4-5.
Compare Brief for Respondents, at 65.
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alities. A supervisory agency like the Civil Service Commission will have
a difficult time at best in securing full adherence to the theoretical
pattern.
It is charged that the incumbents of particular positions may be fav-
ored or discriminated against in the assignment of work, with salary
effects to emerge in subsequent reclassification of the positions.2 In
consequence, so runs the complaint, Section 11's requirement that the
Commission and not the agencies determine the compensation of ex-
aminers"3 has been violated. In any event, the existence of different
grades of positions, calling for the exercise of a doubtful judgment as to
the probable difficulty of cases in assigning work to examiners, is said to
increase the possibility of manipulation to secure examiners favorable
to the agency's contentions in particular cases. Thus, the Administrative
Procedure Act's requirement of assignment of examiners to cases in
rotation so far as practicable,84 which would point to a single examiner
if all were in one grade, may allow a choice among those available in two
or three grades, so long as that number of grades exists.
No evidence has come to light that manipulation of case assignments
for the purpose of influencing decisions has taken place. One witness
before the Committee on Hearing Officers of the President's Conference
on Administrative Procedure mentioned that the legal staff of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission probably had its preferences among the
hearing officers employed by that agency, but not that these preferences
influenced the assignment of cases.8 5 There have been statements that
hearing officers, aware of their dependence upon the employing agencies
for favorable assignment to cases and for promotion, tend consciously
or unconsciously to decide in accordance with agency wishes; 86 but this
tendency is obviously hard to distinguish from proper deference to agency
policy. What seems much more probable than improper manipulation
by agencies where several grades of hearing-officer positions exist is the
appearance of deviation from prescribed methods in assigning these offi-
cers to cases and in effecting promotions, which sometimes results from
quite different reasons. This appearance gives rise to question and suspi-
cion and may result in impairment of morale.
Differentiation among cases in advance for the purpose of assigning
82 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 76; Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
345 U.S. 128 (1952); Brief for Respondents, 55-56. This argument conflicts with the
argument made by others, that the classification standards are impossible to follow.
83 Supra note 39.
84 Ibid.
85 Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, 510-514.
86 Id. at 217; Draft Report, supra note 2, at 33, 76.
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hearing officers to them is an inexact operation at best. The Civil Service
Commission's rule speaks only of assignment in rotation, so far as prac-
ticable, to cases that are "normally assigned" to particular grades of
positions.87 Departures from the norm are admittedly proper when cases
are grouped geographically for hearing by a single examiner or occa-
sionally when no examiner in the proper grade is available. Within a
grade, "legitimate specialization" among examiners according to subject
matter may be permitted.8" Continuous supervision of agency practice
in this regard by the Civil Service Commission, such as Section 11 may
permit,89 would obviously be difficult and might ensnarl the assignment
process in cumbersome analyses and reports to the Commission. The
Commission has refrained from intruding into this area of agency prac-
tice, except to determine from time to time whether the duties of partic-
ular positions have been so affected as to warrant a change of grade.90
Deviation from prescribed methods in respect to promotions may
seem to occur because of the departure of an agency's actual structure
from that which appears on paper. There may, for example, be more
high-grade positions authorized than are currently filled. The reasons
may be budgetary; but an official who eyes an existing vacancy and is
convinced that his work falls properly into the higher category will hardly
be comforted by explanations or have his suspicions of favoritism toward
those in the higher grade stilled. Agency administrators, like other people,
moreover, ordinarily desire freedom of action in their work, including
discretion to hire and promote personnel within the limits imposed by
appropriations. In their eyes a good agency personnel officer is likely
to be one who, together with other qualities, possesses ability to produce
a paper vacancy when desired. Hence vacant positions may be main-
tained in an agency and be filled from time to time in seemingly unac-
countable fashion. The reason, however, may lie in considerations that
are free of actual impropriety.
Under Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act hearing officers
are to receive compensation prescribed by the Civil Service Commis-
87 16 Fed. Reg. 9626 (1951), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.12.
88 Brief for Respondents, supra note 82, at 40; H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
46 (1946) ; S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1946).
89 That Section, supra note 39, authorizes the Commission to "require reports by
agencies," as well as "promulgate rules," "[flor the purposes of this section." Whether this
power extends beyond the functions vested in the Commission itself, so as to confer general
authority to see to the agencies' performance of their duties toward hearing officers, is a
disputed point. Except for the provision in its regulations, supra note 87, the Commission
has acted in the belief that assignment of examiners to cases is not a matter with which
it is empowered to deal. Draft Report, supra note 2, at G-18-19.
90 Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, 1217-1228, 1241-1242.
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sion. 1 The Commission's function in this regard extends to the selection
of hearing officers for promotion; 92 but except for a recent qualification,93
the determination of when a position shall be filled by promotion is left
to the agencies.94 Although arguably the duty to prescribe compensation
for hearing officers includes the determination of when to promote as well
as whom to select for promotion, the assumption of this function by the
Commission would raise problems. It might involve intrusion into the
agencies' financial management and would substitute the Commission's
choice for the agencies' in deciding when vacancies should be filled by
promotion and when new blood should be brought in by new appoint-
ments or by other means.95 So substantial an invasion of previous agency
responsibilities is not likely to be attempted without further legislation.
These administrative aspects of the classification and promotion prob-
lem supplement the possibility of improper agency influence over exam-
iners as a basis for advocating that, so long as hearing officers remain
agency employees rather than become members of a separate corps, all
differences of grade and salary among them within each agency should
91 Supra note 39.
92 The Commission, under its regulation as now amended, maintains promotion registers
for those agencies having more than one grade of hearing officers, from which incumbents
are selected for promotion according to their rank. Draft Report, supra note 2, at 35-36.
Until April, 1951 the agencies were permitted to select hearing officers for promotion, subject
to checks by the Civil Service Commission which were different during various periods. Draft
Report, supra note 2, at 33-35. An opinion of the Attorney General, 41 Ops. Att'y Gen.
No. 14 (1951), advising that the duty to determine the compensation of hearing officers,
which Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act imposed upon the Commission, in-
cluded the duty to determine which officer should receive a particular promotion, caused the
Commission to assume this function. 16 Fed. Reg. 9626 (1951), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.4(a).
93 Under the regulation supra note 92, as amended June 5, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 3317,
when a position is reclassified upward by the Commission, the resulting higher-grade vacancy
must be filled by promotion. If the increase is for just one grade, the former incumbent
will compete with others of the same rank for the vacancy.
94 The other means of filling positions are outlined in the Draft Report, supra note 2, at
31-32. They consist of new appointments from the register of eligibles maintained by the
Civil Service Commission and various types of choice of present or past Government em-
ployees other than hearing officers in the same agency. Except for hearing officers already
in the same grade as the vacancy, who may be transferred or reinstated freely, and for
certain former employees in the legislative or judicial branch who, by statute, may qualify
non-competitively, only such employees not on the register as qualify in a special examina-
tion for top places on it may be named to a vacancy. Because they receive a special ex-
amination which takes account of their qualifications to date, such persons receive an
advantage not available to others, except veterans with disability preference. The Presi-
dent's Conference on Administrative Procedure has recommended that this advantage be
withdrawn and that future appointments be confined to the register of eligibles and to
persons who are already hearing officers. Minutes, Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday,
October 15, 1954, at 6.
95 Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1952); Brief for
Petitioners, 50-54.
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disappear. Before this conclusion is accepted, however, at least two other
aspects of the problem should be considered. One is the question of
finances. If there is to be no differentiation of grades, all hearing officers
within an agency must be capable of handling the most difficult cases and
must be compensated accordingly. The annual bill would not be large;"
but an economy-minded Executive and Congress might eye the prospect
with hostility. A more important question is whether an adequately-
motivated staff of examiners can be maintained over the years within an
agency if promotions are not available. This question was often asked
during the hearings before the Committee on Hearing Officers and never
answered except by occasional assertions which are accepted in the state-
ment in the Draft Report of four members of the Committee that "A one
grade system would not destroy incentive. No incentive system is needed
for personnel of such high caliber as hearing officers. They of course
require a good salary, but their primary incentive is excellence in the law
and in the judicial function they perform. The future reward for which
the superior hearing officer strives is the achievement of an enviable
reputation, with its concomitant respect and prestige, and the possibility
perhaps of appointment to a loftier judicial position above and divorced
from that he presently occupies.Y
97
It may be doubted whether this statement is justified; but if it is, it
raises possibilities that should be examined. Calling the hearing officer's
function judicial, attaching a substantial salary to it, and conferring
maximum security of tenure upon the officer will not change the nature
of his work or contribute greatly to enhancing its public reputation
beyond its actual character. Even with attributes of greater independence
and more substantial contribution by hearing officers to agency decisions,
the hearing officer's role remains subordinate to the agency's. When to
this factor is added the somewhat remote or ambulatory aspect, in rela-
tion to the general public, of the tribunal in which the hearing officer
sits, it seems unlikely that an aura similar to that which surrounds the
federal judiciary will ever envelop it. If not, the hearing officer under a
fixed-salary system, who approaches his task, say, in early middle age,
must envisage for the years ahead the milder satisfactions of excellence
in craftsmanship, public service, and honorable reputation among a
relatively small circle of informed persons. As the years go on, such will
be his compensations except as inter-agency transfers may introduce
96 There are slightly under 300 Section 11 hearing officers employed at the present time.
If all were raised to the highest grade, the increased expense might amount in time to
approximately $150,000 a year. It would be less insofar as lower grades were selected as
appropriate single grades for particular agencies.
97 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 76.
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some variety and advancement.98 These are not inconsiderable rewards.
Coupled with adequate remuneration and a good working environment,
they are genuinely attractive; yet, it is a real question whether in many
instances they will not grow pale in time. If so, added incentive, sup-
plied by the prospect of promotion as a reward for superior performance,
may be a valuable supplement. 9
' If hearing officers are linked to the federal judiciary in any fashion,
so that examiners envisage the possibility of advancement to judgeships,
some may attempt to qualify in ways closely related to those which
are generally thought to cause lawyers to be considered. These ways are
not limited to conspicuous professional achievement, but include also
party service and the attainment of reputations upon public issues.
Direct service to political parties will not be open to hearing officers
under existing legislation; ' 00 but controversial action pleasing to parties
or powerful economic groups will be readily possible for hearing officers
attached to some agencies. Some may be tempted to take advantage of
these opportunities.1 1 It will in any event be difficult to avoid the suspi-
cion at times that decisions are motivated by such considerations. Oppo-
sition to the influence of party politics in the appointment of hearing
officers is expressed by everyone.102 It would be still worse to allow
98 Inter-agency transfers are among the means available for filling vacancies, supra note
94, and are used from time to time. Especial effort is made to arrange them when a reduc-
tion-in-force threatens in a particular agency. Together with reinstatements, transfers have
so far greatly reduced the impact of reductions. Draft Report, supra note 2, 38-39. So long
as grade differences exist, they afford possible means of salary increases; but a hearing officer
proposed for transfer to a higher grade must compete with examiners within the appointing
agency for the preferment. 19 Fed. Reg. 34.6 (1954), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.6. Transfers
are different from inter-agency details, or loans, such as are contemplated by Section 11 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 39, when agencies become temporarily under-
staffed. These too have been used. Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 48.
99 Some proponents of salary uniformity do not indicate specifically whether they would
do away with present within-grade salary increases. These confer annual increments of $200
each 18 months in the grades occupied by hearing officers, up to the maximum for the
grade. 63 Stat. 965, 967 (1949), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1121 (1952). With a salary spread of
$1,000 in each grade, they may extend over a seven and one-half year period. Proponents
of "A single salary grade per agency" in the present sense of "grade" would retain these
increases; a ".specific salary for a particular agency" would appear to eliminate them. Rec-
ommendations' to both effects were made to the President's Conference on Administrative
Procedure. The policy arguments used point both ways on this issue.
100 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i (1952).
101 A hearing officer might think, for example, that prominence as a proponent of some
controverted viewpoint in labor, electric power, or communications matters could result in
preferment if political winds blew in the direction of his views.
102 Objection to possible political influence formed a principal basis of opposition to S.
1708, supra note 3, providing for Presidential appointment of hearing officers. Draft Report,
supra note 2, at 72; CA. Miller, address, summarized at 6 Ad. Law Bull. 11-12 (1953). The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, recommending passage of the same bill, which provided
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that and other, equally harmful influences, or the suspicion of them, to
enter into the actual work which hearing officers do.
In the presence, therefore, of real doubt whether uniformity in the
grade and salaries of hearing officers in an agency is consistent with ade-
quate incentives to high-quality performance on their part; in the absence
of more than a suspicion of abuse connected with a system of several
grades;' 10 and in the light of dangers connected with the one-grade
system suggested to the President's Conference on Administrative Proce-
dure, it seems the better part of wisdom to retain the present statutory
provision on this point. The number of grades has been greatly reduced
by action of the Civil Service Commission, with the result that many
agencies now have only one.'0 It will be possible to compare the work-
ing of alternative patterns in different agencies and so to gain the ad-
vantage of additional experience, if a statutory change in this regard
is not made now. The recommendation of the President's Conference
therefore seems sound.'05
C. The Question of Reductions in Force
The question whether hearing officers should be subject to reduction-
in-force procedures is separable from the other personnel problems pre-
that appointments are to be made without reference to political affiliations, took the position
that, "far from making appointments political, provision for Presidential appointment with
Senate confirmation is the best way to remove these hearing examiner jobs as far as possible
from politics." S. Rep. No. 2199, supra note 3, at 2.
103 Statements by present and former hearing officers that the agencies they served did
not influence their examiners in any way were made frequently in the hearings before the
Committee on Hearing Officers of the President's Conference. Draft Report, supra note 2,
at G-27-G-28. No complaint against an agency on this score had ever been made to the
Civil Service Commission. Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 174 (testimony of
Lawrence V. Meloy, Chief Law Officer, Civil Service Commission). The possibility of an
agency's tailoring its structure of available vacancies to suit its purposes with respect to the
promotion of employees is illustrated by an example recited to the Committee on Hearing
Officers of the President's Conference. Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at 264-267.
There is no indication that pressure or favoritism was involved in the instance recited.
104 Supra at p. 300. A separate argument in favor of eliminating the possibility of pro-
motions has been the delays and frustrations that have attended them. These, however,
have resulted in recent years partly from the Ramspeck case litigation. Delays will in any
event be less under the Civil Service Commission's new promotion procedures than previ-
ously. Draft Report, supra note 2, at 35; Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 19-21.
105 The recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure that there be only one grade of hearing officer in each agency at a fixed salary, with
perhaps two grades in the Government as a whole, accompanied a recommendation that
appointments be for definite seven-year terms, with new appointees required to serve pro-
bationary terms of not more than one year. Final Report, supra note 7, at 46-48. The
minority of the Committee, which recommended twelve-year terms, suggested a much
greater range of salaries but would have prohibited any increase or decrease in the salary
of an individual hearing officer during his term. Id. at 238.
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sented. It turns on issues similar to those involved in the question of
promotions. From an operating standpoint, no reason exists why hearing
officers should not be subject to the same consequences of fiscal policy or
change in the volume of work to be done as other administrative officers,
unless there is danger from this cause of undesirable effects upon their
work. Again the governing theory is free from objection. The agency
determines the classes of positions that can best be vacated in terms of
their relation to work needing to be done. Within the areas so marked
out, employees in comparable positions are selected for separation ac-
cording to criteria specified in applicable regulations.' 6 Under the regu-
lations for hearing officers, these criteria relate simply to veterans' pref-
erence and length of service, requiring the retention of those who possess
seniority. The charge is made that agencies can and sometimes do make
use of the opportunity allegedly afforded by reductions in force to get
rid of unwanted hearing officers or at least that the possibility of such
action may affect the independence and objectivity of hearing officers. 07
The positions to be involved in a reduction in force may, for example, be
so defined as to include a grade of hearing-officer positions in which it is
known that the unwanted incumbent will be reached and quite arbitrarily
to exclude other grades of such positions from the area affected. This
danger would be reduced by elimination of grades of hearing-officer
positions, but would not be altogether eliminated because the hearing
officers as a whole could be included or excluded as the agency saw fit.
If a force of the original size were actually needed and could be paid
from available funds, the resulting vacancies could later be filled by
other means than reinstatement of the former incumbent. The means
usually available have, however, been severely restricted by the appli-
cable regulation.'
No evidence of actual abuse in reductions in force relating to hearing
officers has been adduced. The problem has been of slight magnitude in
terms of actual separations, because such means as inter-agency transfers
have been available, and have been used, to minimize loss of employment
among hearing officers through reductions in force.' 0 9 As a result of
legislation to revise the hearing-officer personnel system in other respects,
it may be possible to reduce still further such hazard of loss of employ-
ment through agency action as now exists. Until such legislation is en-
acted, the problem may be kept to a minimum by administrative measures
10 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 37; 18 Fed. Reg. 5561 (1953), 5 Code Fed. Regs.
§ 34.15; 17 Fed. Reg. 11,733 (1952), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 20.4.
107 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 38.
108 17 Fed. Reg. 11,733 (1952), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 20.7.
109 Supra note 98.
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such as have already been employed, supplemented by others which
were suggested to the President's Conference on Administrative Proce-
dure but tabled by that body.
n' °
V. THE RESOLUTION OF MAJOR IssuEs
The respects in which it is proposed to alter the hearing officer per-
sonnel system, aside from the matters already discussed, involve the
methods of initially selecting hearing officers and the agency that should
be placed in charge of administering the system. These questions are
obviously fundamental and affect all the others that have been brought
up.
A. Methods of Selecting Hearing Officers
In discharging its responsibilities under Section 11 as now written the
Civil Service Commission has applied the methods developed in con-
nection with federal personnel administration generally, modified to
meet the over-all purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act and cer-
tain specific requirements of Section 11.111 The departures the Commis-
sion has made from its usual practice, aside from the elimination of
efficiency ratings and the provision of opportunity for hearing by the
Commission before a hearing officer can be removed," 2 add up to the
requirement that all persons within the federal service or seeking rein-
statement or reemployment in it, whom it is sought to name to hearing-
officer positions, except persons previously in such a position of equally
high grade, must qualify through a competitive test administered by the
Commission." 3 Hearing officers considered for an increase of grade must
compete with others of their previous grade in the same agency or the
agency to which they are proposed for transfer;" 4 all others previously
in the Government must compete with those having the highest places
on the Commission's open register." 5 By these means the Commission
endeavors to secure hearing officers with the best obtainable qualifications
and to hold the balance among hearing officers in relation to advancement.
110 Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 48; Minutes, Monday, November 8,
1954-Tuesday, November 9, 1954, at 5.
111 Supra note 39.
112 19 Fed. Reg. 3319 (1954), 5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.101 et seq.
113 The only circumstance in which anyone can qualify for a hearing-officer position
without such a test involves former employees of the legislative and judicial branches of
the Government who may qualify noncompetitively (i.e., by meeting minimum require-
ments), by virtue of a statute conferring this right upon them. 19 Fed. Reg. 11,733 (1954),
5 Code Fed. Regs. § 34.3(d) (1).
14 Supra notes 92, 94.




The Commission's regulations form a logically consistent whole and
signify a considered effort to carry out the mandate of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Especially noteworthy are the provisions which prevent
agencies from preferring their non-hearing-officer personnel for advance-
ment to hearing-officer positions except in competition with outsiders who
are on the register;116 for otherwise the tendency to favor deserving
applicants within an agency, whose qualifications and disposition are
known, over better-qualified outsiders, would go largely unchecked. 1
Criticism of the Commission's administration, which has again become
vigorous, has exceeded its justification. Even during the earlier years of
the Commission's administration the extreme shifts of policy and adminis-
tration which this writer called the hearing-officer fiasco"" resulted as
much from outside pressures upon the Commission as from internal fac-
tors. Since then the Commission has pursued a straight course, adhering
to its regulations and methods except for amendments of detail. The
amendments have introduced improvements. It is fair to. say that they
have come too slowly, occurring only after outside criticism has
mounted; "I but they represent, nevertheless, a significant adaptation
of Civil Service methods to the problems presented. An additional change
recently made, which establishes coordination of all phases of the
hearing-officer program of the Commission under the Director of the
Bureau of Departmental Operations assisted by the Administrative Offi-
cer for the Hearing Examiner Program, 20 should stimulate continuous,
specialized attention to that program. It may well be followed, if the
116 A general principle of the federal civil service is that persons possessing "competitive
status," which ordinarily is acquired by appointment pursuant to competitive examination,
have "basic eligibility to be noncompetitively selected to fill a vacancy in a [different]
competitive position." Exec. Order No. 10,577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521 (1954), § 1.3(c). ,Legal
positions are particularly likely to attract non-professional Government personnel because of
the possibility of meeting the professional requirements through part-time study.
117 The indications are that the Commission's effort has been fairly successful. An excep-
tional situation arose in the ICC when 55 positions in the Bureau of Motor Carriers
were made Section 11 positions as a result of the decision in Riss & Co. v. United States,
341 US. 907 (1951), at which time the incumbents were accepted as Section 11 hearing
officers pursuant to noncompetitive examinations. Fifty of the remaining 65 vacancies
occurring in hearing-officer positions after the register requirement became effective were
filled from the Commission's open register. Between 35 and 40 of these were previous
federal employees. Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 22; Draft Report, supra
note 2, at 32, 41, 47, D-7. It is doubtful, however, whether all of the other 15 appointees,
who were found to rank with the top three on the register as a result of the special ex-
aminations given to them, would have been equally successful if they had been examined
at the same time as those on the register. A requirement that such persons qualify for the
register in the regular way seems needed. See supra note 94.
118 Op. cit. supra note 2.
119 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 57; Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 20.
120 Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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Commission retains jurisdiction, by acceptance of a recommendation of
the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure that the pro-
gram be placed under a separate bureau, headed by a committee of
lawyers and Commission officials."2 '
The question remains whether the Civil Service Commission's system,
even with present and prospective improvements in it, adequately ef-
fectuates the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act and, insofar
as it does not, what further measures are called for. Most of the dis-
cussion in the recent controversy over promotions, reductions in force,
and related matters has not gone to the heart of the matter, which con-
cerns chiefly the methods of competitive examination and of administer-
ing competitive registers, employed by the Commission. As applied to
applicants for initial appointment, these methods involve the assignment
of percentage grades to reflect the qualifications of candidates who have
been found to meet specified minimum experience and other requirements
for a particular grade of position. The names of those who receive pass-
ing marks are then listed in order of rank on the Commission's register
of eligibles for that grade. As requests are received from agencies having
vacancies to fill, the names of the three highest-ranking eligibles still
available are certified in response to each request. The appointment is
to be made from among these three with certain restrictions and limited
exceptions. 2 Examinations are held with such frequency as the needs of
the service are deemed to require, taking account of the anticipated
vacancies, the expense of an examination, the desirability of affording a
reasonable period of opportunity to those who have qualified, and the
desirability of admitting those who become interested or become eligible
for examination by meeting the minimum experience requirements during
the intervening periods. 2 3
The factors which are "rated" in determining the percentage grade
of each applicant for the hearing-officer register embrace the value of
his professional experience in relation to the work to be done and his
ability in various respects of which the following are typical: ability
to analyze and evaluate evidence, ability to interpret and apply law,
121 Minutes, Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday, October 15, 1954,3-4.
122 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 25, 31; 12 Fed. Reg. 2832 (1947), as amended, 5 Code
Fed. Regs. §§ 2.106-2.111.
123 The original examination for hearing-officer positions under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act resulted in the establishment of the present register in May, 1950 and has been
followed by a second examination in 1954. Veterans with disability preference have had
quarterly examinations available in accordance with the Veterans Preference Act. Draft
Report, supra note 2, at 25, 30. Biennial examinations or other means of keeping registers
current have been recommended. Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, 45-46; op. cit.
supra note 121, at 6.
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ability to make independent decisions in important matters, ability to
write clearly and concisely, ability to be objective and free from in-
fluences which might affect impartial judgment, and ability to preside
at and control meetings, conferences, and hearings with dignity and
poise.12 No written test is given; but experience reflected in the appli-
cants' records is evaluated and their relevant qualities are appraised
on the basis of correspondence or interviews with references, former
employers, associates, etc., and on the basis of an oral interview which
concludes the examination.
It is obvious that mathematical exactness in the grading of intangible
factors such as the foregoing is unattainable.'25 The most that can be
hoped for is that the grades assigned shall reflect as well as possible
"sensed qualitative differences"" 6 in the factors measured. Because of
inescapable error,'127 the resulting rank-order of eligibles reflects only
imperfectly the relative merits of those listed. The choice which agencies
have among the highest-ranking three hardly counteracts the probable
errors. The question arises, therefore, whether a method that leads to
these errors can be justified.
The principal justification for applying an essentially artificial method
of grading and certification to the selection of such officials as hearing
officers'2 s is that thereby improper considerations are excluded from the
process of selection to the maximum extent feasible. Granted that error
enters into the rank-order, the balance is at least held steadily among
competitors; and if the error is not too gross, the resulting advantage
outweighs it. This argument is especially strong as applied to the exclu-
sion of partisan political, racial, and other improper considerations from
124 Pertinent portions of the Commission's examination circular prescribing the examination
are set forth in the Draft Report, supra note 2, at 24-25. In grading incumbents for promo-
tion, performance in office can be rated with possibly greater accuracy as to relative rank
than can be achieved with new applicants.
125 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 70. In addition, weights must be assigned to the various
factors graded, for the purpose of arriving at over-all totals. These weights are necessarily
somewhat arbitrary.
126 Pockrass, "Rating Training and Experience in Merit System Selection," 2 Pub. Pers.
Rev. 211, 215 (1941).
127 So-called selective certification may further counteract the errors inherent in the over-
all rank-order. By this process, which may be made available to an agency when need is
shown, only the names of those eligibles who possess particular qualifications desired by the
agency are certified for consideration in filling a vacancy. In this way not only may con-
sideration be limited to applicants who have had specialized experience, but a wider spread of
percentage grades may also be obtained. See Draft Report, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31.
128 As applied to personnel whose principal qualifications are of a mechanical variety, such
as speed and accuracy in the performance of continuous tasks, the method of percentage
grades and ranked registers continues to be realistic.
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appointments. It also applies to prevention of possible agency efforts to
secure hearing officers who possess desired viewpoints. 2 "
Despite these considerations, the judgment of qualified cohmmenta-
tors has become favorable to less mechanical methods in filling a wide
range of government positions. Four of the eight members of the Presi-
dent's Committee on Civil Service Improvement, reporting in 1941, con-
cluded that "any mechanical ranking and certification would operate in
an undesirably arbitrary manner" as to legal positions. Therefore they
recommended that a merit system employing unranked registers of suit-
able size containing the names of those applicants found to be most
qualified on the basis of appropriate examinations, be placed in effect
for legal positions. 30 Such a system was operated in consultation with
the Civil Service Commission for two years by the Board of Legal Ex-
aminers, created by Executive Order in 1941,11' and was continued for an
additional year by the Commission with the Board as its advisors.' 32
Hearing-officer positions were covered by the system. Since then the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
has recommended that a similar plan be employed for "a majority of
the 15,000 basic occupations in the Federal service" and be administered
largely by the employing agencies themselves with Civil Service Commis-
sion supervision and assistance. 33 The Civil Service Commission has
endorsed legislation to make this plan available to it for scientific and
professional positions.'
The selection of hearing officers could be brought under a merit
129 See the argument of Wilbur R. Lester, Transcript of Proceedings, Pres. Conf. Ad. Proc.,
October 14, 1954, at 582.
130 H.R. Doc. No. 118, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 36-41 (1942).
'31 Exec. Order No. 8743, 3 Code Fed. Reg. 927 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
132 See Report of the Board to the President 1-2 (mimeographed, 1945). The plan was
discontinued because of a provision in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1944,
which has been carried into subsequent acts, forbidding the use of Civil Service Commission
funds for this purpose. See, e.g., 67 Stat. 300 (1953). The writer served as assistant secretary
and secretary to the Board. Its experience is summarized in Fuchs, "The Federal Civil
Service for Lawyers," 11 J.D.C. Bar Ass'n 51 (1944) and 5 Pub. Pers. Rev. 168 (1944).
133 Task Force Report on Federal Personnel 20-25 (Appendix A to the Commission's
Report, 1949) ; Report on Personnel Management 17-18 (1949). The recommendation is that
eligibles be grouped in categories such as "outstanding," "well qualified," and "qualified," with
those in the highest remaining category made available to appointing agencies at a particular
time. The Board of Legal Examiners grouped its eligibles in this manner, without restricting
the availability of the different categories for appointment.
134 See the testimony of Hon. Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the Civil Service Com-
mission, in Hearings before House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on S. 1135,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1952) and Hearings before Senate Committee on Civil Service on
S. 1135, 1148, and 1160, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 101, 106-107, 108 (1951). S. 1135 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951) which passed the Senate, would have authorized the use of the plan for "such
scientific and professional positions as the Commission may designate."
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system of the type thus suggested, which seems especially suited to such
a purpose. Such A plan should be centrally administered, since nation-
wide recruiting of suitable candidates would be difficult for many agencies
and the high caliber and objectivity of hearing officers would be best
secured by entrusting the initial selection of eligibles to a single
agency charged with maintaining the required standards.3 5 The conten-
tion that such a plan will open the door to political influence and favor-
itism in agency selection of eligibles 36 would be justified only if the
registers were to be vastly larger than the number of appointments to
be made. Such, however, need not be the case, since it would be possible
and desirable to limit the number of names on a register to 3 or 4
times the number of appointments expected to be made from it.1s7 If
this were done and the total number of hearing-officer eligibles on the
registers at a given time were, say, the best qualified 50 from among
1500 applicants, 3 8 the opportunities for abuse would be extremely
limited and could be reduced to the vanishing point by alert administra-
tion.
Legislation would be required to establish the system proposed.'
3 9
135 Language in the Congressional Committee reports recommending passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act indicates a contrary conception, since it speaks of the duty of
the Civil Service Commission "to fix appropriate qualifications" and of the agencies "to seek
fit persons," as well as of the probability that the agencies will endeavor "to secure the high-
est type of examiners." Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, 280 (1946) (Legislative
History of the Administrative Procedure Act). The Civil Service Act, however, which Section
11 renders applicable, normally operates through initial selection by the Commission, although
the agencies may recruit candidates, especially for the higher grades of positions.
136 Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 52-53.
137 Such was the proposal in the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Service
Improvement, loc. cit. supra note 130. As to the feasibility of examining methods that will
produce such a selection of eligibles from among a large number of applicants see Benjamin,
Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 279-285 (1942). Benjamin states also
that the qualifications necessary for some hearing-officer positions are so complex and subtle
as to preclude their comparative measurement and grading in competitive examinations. Id.
at 278.
138 There were more than 1700 applicants in the first examination for hearing-officer posi-
tions. The number of appointments that will probably be made to vacancies is difficult to
estimate in advance but is thought likely to be less than 10 a year in the near future, unless
additional agency functions are brought under the formal hearing requirement because of
legislation or judicial decisions. Draft Report, supra note 2, at 41. Allowance must be made
for attrition which a register suffers during its life because persons whose names are listed
become unavailable. On the other hand, additions of veterans with disability preference are
likely to be made, and a specialized administration should be able to reopen the register
frequently to all applicants.
139 The Executive Order establishing the Board of Legal Examiners was issued pursuant to
the President's authority "to prescribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the
civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof," Rev. Stat. §
1753 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1952), and to provide through the Civil Service Rules, with the
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It would be vastly preferable to legislation establishing appointment
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate as provided
in S. 1708 and H.R. 9035, 83d Congress. Because of factors already
noted, 4 ° hearing-officer positions are not of a nature that would attract
persons of the same attainments as those who aspire to Federal judg-
ships or to agency headships which are comparable to judicial posts.
Random selection by the President, unaccompanied by statutory means
of attracting and appraising applicants, would not be likely to secure
hearing officers of consistently high quality; and the appointing proc-
ess, notwithstanding assurances to the contrary by the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary,' 4 ' would almost certainly involve political in-
fluences damaging to the objectivity and specialized ability of the
hearing-officer corps. It is significant that this method of choosing
hearing officers found no support whatever in the President's Confer-
ence on Administrative Procedure. 42 A merit system, attracting persons
who, although mature, have not yet carved out careers, seems needed.
B. The Administering Agency
In the eyes of many, it is desirable to replace the Civil Service
Commission's administration of the hearing-officer merit system with a
fresh approach by an agency designed to bring professional legal judg-
ment consistently to bear. 43 It seems obvious that judgments regarding
aid of the Commission, "as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant," for
open competitive examinations and "selections according to grade from among those graded
highest," 22 Stat. 403 (1883) as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 633 (1952). The Veterans Preference
Act of 1944 now renders mandatory the use of percentage grades and choice from among the
highest three whenever veterans applicants are among those considered for appointment,
whether or not competitive examination requirements are otherwise applicable. 58 Stat. 387
(1944), 5 U.S.C. §§ 851-852, 857-858 (1952).
140 Supra at pp. 306-308.
141 Supra note 102.
142 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 71-72; Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 51-52.
The question was not raised on the floor of the Conference. Four members of the Conference
recommended that routine Presidential appointment of hearing officers previously chosen by
merit-system methods be provided for the sake of prestige. Draft Report, supra note 2, at
72-73. Aside from the artificiality of such a device, it is doubtful at best whether appointment
by the President, if invoked, can validly be limited to confirmation of the nominees of
subordinates. The President might, however, provide by Executive Order for assistance to
him in choosing persons whom he was empowered to appoint; and he might be specifically
authorized by statute to issue such an order.
143 Four members of the Comm. on Hearing Officers of the Pres. Conf. Ad. Proc. who recom-
mended that administration by the Civil Service Commission be retained conceded that
probably a majority of persons consulted by the Committee were of the opposite view.
Report, September 3, 1954, supra note 2, at 55. Agency opinion was, however, predominantly
in favor of modified Civil Service Commission administration. Draft Report, supra note 2, at
K-3-K-5. Such was the final recommendation of the Conference, supra note 3; Minutes,
Thursday, October 14, 1954-Friday, October 15, 1954, 3-4.
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professional experience and ability, which are required in competitive
examinations for hearing-officer positions, can best be made by properly
designated lawyers who possess insight into the procedures and problems
with which hearing officers deal.144 The Civil Service Commission has
lawyers on its staff and invokes the aid of outside lawyers for this
purpose from time to time,'4" but it is unlikely, because of absorption
with larger tasks, to devise methods that would give adequate scope
to professional judgment. A specialized agency that keeps in close,
continuous touch with its problems and solves them in the light of
available experience, would be preferable to one that thinks in terms
of established methods and modifies them as difficulties arise. 4 ' The
"entire tradition" of Civil Service, which Congress sought in Section
11 of the Administrative Procedure Act to invoke in support of security
of tenure for hearing officers,1 47 does not necessarily produce good ad-
ministration in all respects. Its valuable elements need not be lost
because innovations are made in its application to a professional field. 48
144 It is not intended to imply that all hearing officers must be lawyers, although neces-
sarily very few non-lawyers can qualify. Everyone concedes that the conduct of hearings and
the formulation of conclusions on the basis of the record of a hearing are primarily legal work.
The non-lawyer who can learn such work must be an exceptionally able technician in a field
with which a class of hearings deals. It appears that there are a few such people and there
seems to be no sufficient reason to exclude them altogether from the opportunity to become
hearing officers. See Benjamin, op. cit. supra note 137, at 287-288. A few federal hearing
officers are not now members of the bar. Draft Report, supra note 2, at C-11, 19, 20, 28, 32.
145 The Commission's reported plan to use senior-grade hearing officers for rating applicants
in its 1964-55 hearing-officer examination is a case in point, representing a commendable
development. Draft Report, supra note 2 at 30.
146 The fact that the Commission encountered a severe failure when it departed drastically
from its established over-all methods in inaugurating the hearing-officer program may render
it overly wary of experimentation now. Too much importance should not be attached to a
casual remark in the course of a hearing; but it may be significant that the Commission's
chief operating official in administering examinations, who also is responsible for coordinating
the hearing-officer program, is quoted as stating in answer to a question that the Commission
does not find it more difficult to rate professional than non-professional people. Transcript of
Hearings, supra note 12, at 107. Failure to make adequate provision for the special require-
ments of personnel administration for professional positions has been a leading cause of
criticism of federal personnel management. Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Report on Peronnel Management, supra note 133, at 6, 16. The
Commission has, however, made strides since the start of World War II in decentralizing
recruiting and examining for higher-grade positions and in recruiting prospective college
graduates. Exec. Order No. 9830 (1947), Part I, 3 Code Fed. Regs. p. 108 (Supp. 1947);
Task Force Report, supra note 133, at 10, 20-21; Rep. Civ. Ser. Comm'n 19 (1949); id. 15,
19 (1950).
147 Loc. cit. supra note 135.
148 The objection that placing a part of the Federal Government's career and merit system
in a separate agency "is simply to diffuse" its administration, Report, September 3, 1954, supra
note 2, at 55, does not state a disadvantage unless, as is not demonstrated, waste or error
would result. That the new agency would be dependent for certain services upon the Civil
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A new agency in charge of administering the hearing-officer merit
system might be either an independent Office of Administrative Proce-
dure, such as is widely advocated, 49 or an agency for administering a merit
system for legal positions in the Government, if such a system should
again be established.15 In either event the direction of those of the
agency's policies and the formulation of those of its regulations affecting
the hearing-officer system151 should be in the hands of a board composed
of high-ranking hearing officers or Government lawyers, one or more rep-
resentatives of the Civil Service Commission and of administrative
agencies, and a minority of non-Government lawyers.'52 Two essentials
to its satisfactory operation are believed to be a majority of lawyers
and a majority of members from within the Government on the board.
The former would be needed to assure the desired professional judgment
and approach, enriched by the ideas and experience of the administrative
members; the latter would be designed to secure comprehension of the
administrative setting in which hearing officers work and to emphasize
over-all Executive responsibility for the successful operation of the
agencies, aided and supplemented by the private practitioners' under-
Service Commission's staff, as is also stated, is true; but if, as should be the case, Commission
members or officials participate in the direction of the new agency, the resulting difficulties
should be slight.
149 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 56, 59. The proposal for such an Office was supported
not only by the four members of the Committee on Hearing Officers who signed this report
but also by a majority of persons consulted by the Committee. It was originally made by the
Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. Final Report, supra note 7, 123-124, 192-194, 196-198, 221-223,
237-239. Provision for an Office of Administrative Procedure was omitted from the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, perhaps because of objections which had been raised, that the Office as pro-
posed would be political and would interfere, as a "superadministrative agency," with other
agencies. See Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1946). These objections relate less
to the functions with respect to hearing officers, proposed for the Office, than to those relating
to the study and improvement of administrative procedure. The President's Conference on
Administrative Procedure has recommended the establishment of an Office of Administrative
Procedure in the Department of Justice for the latter purpose on an experimental basis. First
Report of the Conference 3-4, 15-17 (1953). An Office so located, responsible to a cabinet
officer in close touch with political affairs, would not be an appropriate agency to administer
a merit system for hearing officers. See Draft Report, supra note 2, at 59.
150 The studies of the present Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government extend to the entire range of problems surrounding the Government's legal serv-
ices, as well as to the hearing-officer problem. Douglas, Storey, works cited, supra note 3.
151 An Office of Administrative Procedure would have functions related to the study and
improvement of administrative procedure, in addition to its hearing-officer functions. The
former would probably not be carried on under the same board as the latter. A legal person-
nel agency, on the other hand, would probably carry on its hearing-officer functions through
the same organization as its other duties.
152 The service of lawyers in private practice would be difficult to obtain under the policy
presently embodied in appropriation acts, which amounts to a prohibition of the performance




standing of the hearing officers' functions in relation to the parties
to proceedings. To secure consistency of the board's policies with
Government-wide merit-system principles, the board's regulations might
be made subject to approval by the Civil Service Commission. Under the
Board there should be a director who would carry out its policies,15 per-
haps in conjunction with other duties of the agency. 54
Much could be said in favor of an independent hearing-officer corps
outside of the agencies, whose members would be assigned to the agencies
for continuous periods by a central administration or to proceedings
case-by-case. Suggestions to this effect, sometimes including housing
of examiners' offices separately from the agencies, were made to the
Committee on Hearing Officers of the President's Conference.' 55 One of
the bills in the 83d Congress, H.R. 9035, would have provided for cases
to be assigned to "administrative judges" through a director and assist-
ant director under regulations prescribed by an administrative commit-
tee of judges. The freedom of hearing officers from agency influence
would be secured by this type of arrangement and the advantages of
specialization could be preserved if hearing officers were assigned con-
sistently to the proceedings of particular agencies.' 56 Such proposals,
however, have not commended themselves to official bodies which have
considered the problem. The Attorney General's Committee rejected the
idea of a separate corps, both because of the need of specialization
by hearing officers and because of agency responsibility for the efficiency
and fairness of hearings. 51 Congress also rejected it.'58 The recom-
153 An alternative form of organization, employing a director advised by a board, would
obviously be possible. It is believed, however, that it would be difficult to enlist and maintain
the interest and participation of board members serving part-time, unless responsibility were
vested in them. Participation by a board of high caliber would be critically important in the
plan proposed.
154 In an Office of Administrative Procedure the director might also be in charge of the
functions relating to procedure and be aided by a varying number of advisory and cooper-
ating groups.
155 Draft Report, supra note 2, Appendix H; Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at
869-873 (testimony of Rufus G. Poole), 1105-7 (testimony of Hon. Douglas L. Edmonds).
In California the Division of Administrative Procedure has a staff of hearing officers which
serves many state agencies with considerable success. There is agency desire for specialization
by hearing officers, however. Heady, Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States 79-85
(1952); Cal. Div. of Ad. Proc., Fourth Biennial Report 10-11, Appendices C-1, C-2 (1953).
156 The need for subject-matter specialization by hearing officers is generally recognized
even by the numerous commentators who believe that professional competence related to the
conduct of hearings is the quality primarily to be sought when hearing officers are selected.
In this view, specialized expertness may be acquired after appointment, through study and
experience. Draft Report, supra note 2, 56-57, 73-74, G-2--G-5, K-1-K-2.
15 Final Report, supra note 7, at 47.




mendations of the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure
contemplate no change in this regard.
There is scarcely need for so radical a departure from previous
forms of organization as would be involved in placing hearing officers
in a separate corps. Although the effect of such a step would not be
bad if the administration of the corps were fully aware of agency needs
and adequately equipped to meet them, the same advantages of protec-
tion to the independence of hearing officers and maintenance of adequate
incentives among them can be obtained through specialized, professional
administration of a merit system applicable to hearing officers on the
staffs of the agencies. Hence there is no need to override the strong
belief among agencies that the final selection of hearing officers to per-
form their work should be lodged with them.'59
The independence and adequate motivation of hearing officers in the
employ of agencies would be sought under adequate merit-system ad-
ministration by taking the following steps in addition to the safeguards
surrounding proposed dismissals: (1) confine new appointments to a
narrowly-selected group of qualified eligibles; (2) prevent appointments
of non-hearing-officer Government personnel, except such as qualify in
regular examinations for the register of eligibles; (3) select hearing
officers for promotion or transfer to a higher grade by the central ad-
ministration; (4) continually study the performance of hearing officers
by the scrutiny of records of hearings, decisions, and reports of hearing
officers on a sampling basis, accompanied by cultivation of personal con-
tact with hearing officers and receptiveness to complaints from them;
(5) adjust difficulties through conferences with agencies where feasible;
(6) arrange inter-agency transfers to relieve difficult situations, to pro-
mote interest of hearing officers in their work, and to absorb personnel
released through reductions in force;' 60 and (7) provide for conferences
of hearing officers and other interchange that would promote esprit de
corps and effective performance of work. An administration that under-
took these tasks, if reasonably well equipped to do so, would stand a good
chance of success and would be in a position to recommend further
legislation if more turned out to be needed.
An administration able to keep in touch with hearing-officer perform-
ance by the means suggested would be able to avoid relying upon agency
159 Draft Report, supra note 2, at K-5 - K-6.
160 Except in the face of drastic over-all governmental retrenchment, a specialized adminis-
tration should at least equal the Civil Service Commission's considerable success in eliminat-
ing the effects of reductions in force. See supra, p. 309. If evidence of abuse arose, legis-
lation to provide for tenure during good behavior might be sought.
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judgment and the judgment of lawyers who have appeared before hear-
ing officers in arriving at judgments upon promotions, as the Civil
Service Commission has found it necessary to do.' 6 ' It is surely incon-
sistent with the dignity and effectiveness, if not the objectivity, of
officers who preside at hearings to introduce the consciousness that
the attorneys who appear before them may later be asked for judgments
upon their performance. The reliance that has been placed in the ethics
and responsibility of members of the bar as a safeguard against im-
propriety 62 is largely justified; but there could be situations where it was
misplaced. In any event the relationships which the practice estab-
lishes163 are inconsistent with the purpose of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. In the absence of a kind of administration that can avoid
such a practice, the need for promotions should indeed be abolished.
C. Hearing Officer-Agency Working Relationships
With the independence of hearing officers safeguarded in the fore-
going manner in relation to appointment and personal administration,
there would be no need at the present time of additional general legis-
lation regarding the manner in which hearing officers carry on their
functions. Limits to the accuracy of the judicial analogy to the position
of the hearing officer are apparent. Whether in a deciding agency like
the National Labor Relations Board or in the more typical agency that
may be a party to proceedings before itself, the hearing officer acts
within the organization as the representative of agency heads. His
status should be appropriate to that position; his methods should be
such as will enable him in that situation to command the confidence of
parties, including the agency, and to discharge objectively, yet with use
of the agency's resources, his duty to formulate conclusions based on the
record of the hearing before him.
If there are sufficient protections against agency pressure upon the
hearing officer, the grounds for limiting his consultation with agency
personnel after a hearing has ended, while formulating his conclusions,
are reduced to three: (1) avoidance of prejudice through the influence
of personnel imbued with a point of view in the case; (2) preservation
to the parties of their right to rebut evidence and answer contentions
161 Draft Report, supra note 2, at 29, 52, 74-75; Transcript of Hearings, supra note 12, at
39, 1230.
162 Id. at 1237 (testimony of Wilson Matthews, Examiner in charge of hearing officers for
the Civil Service Commission).
163 The relation is quite different from the one that arises between a candidate for appoint-
ment or promotion and a selected member of an examining board who bases his judgment on
an oral interview or on the record of the candidate's entire past performance.
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adverse to their positions; and (3) exclusion of various undefined in-
fluences that have not emerged at the hearing but may be suspected.
Militating against these considerations is the right of the parties and of
the public to have the agency's knowledge and expertness brought to
bear in reaching conclusions.
The first reason just stated operates more strongly where the agency
has filed charges or a complaint of some kind than it does in other
proceedings. The third reason, insofar as it refers (as often it does)
to allegedly preconceived views of the agency or members of its staff,
possesses an importance which depends on the subject matter of those
views. If the suspected views relate to unsettled issues of law or of
policy that is truly general, such as whether consumers are entitled to
know what they are getting in a food product even though ignorance
might not harm them physically or cheat them, there is relatively little
reason to object to consultation concerning the issues. If, on the other
hand, the views relate to issues upon which the conduct or qualifica-
tions of the parties have a bearing, such as whether local applicants
for broadcasting frequencies should be preferred over non-local, the
objection to consultation becomes stronger because enterprises have
staked out their claims and feel entitled to litigate their contentions.
The Administrative Procedure Act differentiates among licensing
proceedings, other instances of adjudication, and rule-making in its
restrictions on consultation by hearing officers and its requirements
for initial decisions and recommended decisions.' The distinctions
thus made are about as realistic as can be hoped for in general legisla-
tion. "Adjudication," to which all of the restrictions and requirements
apply, includes proceedings in which the agency has charged a respondent
with violation of law and such hearings as are necessary on claims for
old age and survivors insurance. They are important in the former but
probably are unnecessary in the latter because the agency does not
occupy a position adverse to the claimant. They are, however, hardly
a handicap in the claims cases, in which the result turns on evidence
relating to specific events in the lives of individuals. The liberalization
of procedure in initial licensing recognizes the "forward-looking function"
being performed and the different treatment that may need to be given
to "estimates, forecasts, and opinions" from that required for conclu-
sions based on evidence of past fact;.. 5 yet the parties are rendered
uneasy by the liberalization. 168 Insofar as the requirements of the Act
164 Supra at pp. 291-292.




fail to work satisfactorily, they can of course be changed by specific
legislation, such as that affecting the National Labor Relations Board,' 16 7
the Federal Communications Commission,"" and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service."6 9
As they stand, the Act's provisions, in cases of adjudication other than
initial licensing, but only in such cases, eliminate post-hearing, off-the-
record consultation by hearing officers on any fact in issue 7 ° and forbid
off-the-record participation in any manner by agency personnel engaged
in investigating or prosecuting functions in the particular case or a fac-
tually related case.' In this way proceedings which are likely to present
important issues of policy are roughly differentiated from those where the
issues relate more largely to issues of past fact. 2  In the former con-
sultation is not forbidden; in the latter it is. In the former, also, the
hearing officer's formulation of conclusions can be dispensed with under
narrowly limited circumstances; in the latter it cannot be. 73 In short,
the independent hearing officer remains independent as to matters that
should turn on the hearing alone; but agency personnel may take part to
some extent when non-record factors can properly enter in.
It should not be expected that this legislatively-prescribed pattern,
even when strengthened and improved by a superior status for the hear-
ing officer and reinforced by stricter provisions as to particular agencies,
166 See supra note 56.
167 61 Stat. 139, 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 160(c) (1952). These provisions of the
1947 Act change the role of the trial examiner from that permitted under the Administrative
Procedure Act by prohibiting him from consulting with the Board concerning exceptions taken
to his findings, rulings, or recommendations and by requiring that his report and recom-
mended order become the decision of the Board unless expected to. They are not to be
reviewed except by Board members or their legal assistants.
168 66 Stat. 721 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 409(b), (c) (1952). An initial decision by the hearing
officer who conducts a hearing is required. He is forbidden to consult any person, except
another examiner assigned to the same case, on any question of fact or law in issue, unless
upon notice to the parties and opportunity for them to participate, and is further forbidden to
consult with the Commission or any of its employees concerning the initial decision or any
exceptions taken to his findings, rulings, or recommendations.
169 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952) (dispenses with the requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act that hearing officers perform no investigative or prosecuting
function, except as to the case being heard).
170 Section 5(c) of the Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952). It has been
argued that this provision does not prohibit consultation with agency staff members not
engaged in investigating or prosecuting the particular case or a factually-related one. Davis,
Administrative Law 361, 415-416 (1951). If this interpretation is correct, an amendment
to the section is needed.
171 Section 5(c), 60 Stat. 239 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
172 Cf. Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 14-16 (1947).
173 Section 8(a) of the Act, supra note 19, 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1952).
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can do duty for adequate discharge of their functions by the agency
heads' 74 and for sound inter-agency structure and relationships. 5 If
the agency environment is unhealthy in particular situations, healthy
results of formal proceedings in the agency can arise only from other,
more fundamental measures than the attempt to place a "judge" in the
midst of the situation. Especially is this true when his decisions are
issued-as they must be unless an administrative court is substituted for
the agency-under the ultimate control of top officials.
An additional hazard would be created if the hearing officer were more
largely removed from an institutional context. This hazard would stem
from the methods of advocacy in litigation which, with all of the value
that can rightly be credited to them, may serve to distort rather than
reveal the truth when carried beyond their proper province. That prov-
ince does not extend to dominance over the ascertainment of facts and
the evolution of policy in economic and scientific matters, with which
administrative agencies are so often concerned. Litigation has its place
in administrative processes because of effects which these processes have
on interests that need protection. The role of litigation is enlarged be-
cause the methods of rebuttal and cross-examination, incident to the pres-
entation of evidence in litigation, can aid in arriving at scientific truth
under some circumstances. Other aspects of litigation, however, especi-
ally advocacy in relation to the process of decision, may prove damaging.
In the setting of formal administrative hearings it is natural for lawyers
to seek full opportunity to use their methods and, having received it, to
exploit it to the fullest extent. If the hearing officer, ordinarily a lawyer
himself, is left with no recourse except his own knowledge when closeted
with the record of a hearing, the product he turns out may be seriously
deficient in relation to technical matters, especially if the material sup-
plied to him via the hearing is artfully devised to lead to the advocate's
predetermined conclusion. He should not be allowed to seek evidence to
supplement the record without notifying the parties; but proper official
notice of facts 76 and consultation as to law and policy should often be
available.
An eminent administrative practitioner, speaking recently of admin-
istrative hearings in non-legislative proceedings, has admonished mem-
bers of the bar that "The preparation of proposed findings of fact calls
174 Cf. supra note 52.
175 Cf. supra notes 49, 50.
17S Official notice which is at all disputable should be accompanied or followed by op-




for the most skillful advocacy. Their object is to persuade the finder of
fact . . . Ideal findings of fact . . . will both tempt and threaten the
examiner-tempt him with their clarity, completeness, and reasonable-
ness and by virtue of these same qualities threaten him with reversal if
they are ignored."'1 77 Accuracy of the proposed findings is undoubtedly
implied by "completeness and reasonableness"; yet where the conclusions
to be drawn involve debatable economic results or physical effects of de-
sired or disputed actions, the advocate's cultivated art may unintention-
ally mislead as easily as furnish a reliable guide. Confronted with the
temptations placed before him by advocacy, the hearing officer, in a tech-
nical field where the record of the hearing may not fully embody the con-
siderations bearing on his problem, needs the aid of the consultation
which the institutional method should in many cases supply. His "inde-
pendence" ought not to be made a helpless one by denying this aid. To
explore the proper boundaries of official knowledge, official notice, and
advice as to relevant general considerations, within which assistance to
the hearing officer must be confined, would carry this paper beyond its
province. It is there, however, that further light on the hearing officer
problem will be found. As it is found, the problems of fair, effective pro-
cedure, of which the hearing-officer problem is symptom and symbol, will
move closer to solution.
177 Charles S. Rhyne, Trying an Administrative Case: address printed at 100 Cong. Rec.
3925-3927 (Mar. 31. 1954). See also 40 A.B.AJ. 751 (1954).
1955]
